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In the years since September 11, 2001, scholars have advocated two main
positions on the role of law and the proper balance of powers among the
branches of government in emergencies. This Article critiques these two
approaches-which could be called Legalism and Decisionism-and offers
a third way. Debates between Legalism and Decisionism turn on
(1) whether emergencies can be governed by prescribed legal norms; and
(2) what the balance of powers among the three branches of government
should be in emergencies. Under the Legalist approach, legal norms can
and should guide governmental response to emergencies, and the executive
branch is constrained by law in emergencies. In contrast, under the
Decisionist approach, legal norms cannot respond to all emergencies, and
therefore the executive branch is and should be the primary decision-maker
in emergencies. Legalists emphasize the importance in
emergencies of norms, and Decisionists emphasize the importance in
emergencies of decisions.
This Article shows not only the disagreements between Legalism and
Decisionism but also the three key political assumptions that they often
share. First, they agree that emergencies trigger a necessity for security
measures that may curtail civil liberties. Second, they perceive public
enemies as distinct from private enemies. Third, they share the view that the
primary goal of the state and its laws is the prevention of future
catastrophes. This Article offers an alternative approach, which I call
"Humanist Decisionism. " Humanist Decisionism departs from both
Legalism and Decisionism in its attempt to replace the prevailing politics of
necessity, enmity, and catastrophe with a politics of friendship and
hospitality. This approach has normative implications for the desirability of
the legal distinction between public and private enemies, for the level of
judicial scrutiny regarding the existence of an emergency, and for the
possibility of adopting political and legal measures of friendship and
hospitality towards the so-called enemy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Legalism and Decisionism are the prevailing attitudes to governance in
emergencies. In the years since September 11, 2001, advocates of Legalism
and Decisionism have debated the role of law and the proper balance of
powers among the branches of government in emergencies. By
"Decisionism" this Article means an approach that emphasizes the limits of
ordinary laws and the consequent key role of the executive branch in
emergencies. "Legalism," by contrast, is an approach that maintains that
ordinary norms can and should govern in emergencies and that all three
branches of government must participate in the decision-making process in
emergencies.
In U.S. emergency-powers debates, the position associated with
executive power is sometimes called "deferential" or "executive
unilateralism." In contrast, the position associated with the rule of law is
sometimes called "civil libertarian" or "civil libertarian idealism."' However,
this taxonomy is deficient because it creates an odd asymmetry. The terms
"deferential" and "executive unilateralism" mark the proposed institutional
decision-maker in emergencies (the executive branch), whereas the term
"civil libertarian" emphasizes legal substance (civil liberties). This taxonomy
confusingly sets up the debate as one between actors and values. Emergency-
powers debates are better understood as debates between Legalism and
Decisionism.
Debates between Legalism and Decisionism turn on two main issues: (1)
whether emergencies can be governed by prescribed legal norms that apply
in ordinary times; and (2) how the balance of power among the three
branches of government should operate in emergencies. The gist of
Decisionism is that in extraordinary emergency situations ordinary laws are
inadequate, and the executive branch must step up and act. Legalists
disagree. They focus on the importance of the rule of law, and underscore
that all three branches of government are bound by law in emergencies. 2
I See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15-18 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers: The United States'
Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296, 296-97
(2004) (contrasting "executive unilateralism" with "civil libertarian idealism").
2 For the sources of my distinction between Legalism and Decisionism, see CARL
SCHMITT, POLITCAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREiGNTY 3
(George Schwab ed., Univ. Chi. Press 2005) (1922) [hereinafter SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY] ("The pure normativist thinks in terms of impersonal rules, and the
decisionist. ... by means of a personal decision. .. ); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics Of
Critique, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 1147, 1163 (200 1) ("What makes the thinker a decisionist
is not that he has a global or ontological critique of justificatory closure, but that, after
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The mapping of Legalism and Decisionism offered here is necessary but
difficult. Disputes between these two positions are not new. There have long
been different versions of each, and they have at times made important
concessions to each other. For example, as we will later see, the Decisionist
argument in favor of executive acts outside the law (often understood in terms
of absolute power) has long been normalized by saying that it is permitted by
law.3 And on the other hand, some Legalist positions have historically
accepted the exercise of extra-legal power under the important condition that
the law does not legitimize it.4 Nonetheless, the Article argues that it is helpful
to identify Legalism and Decisionism as two competing sets of intuitions and
arguments that are currently at odds in emergency-powers debates.
Despite significant differences between Legalism and Decisionism, the
Article ultimately argues that they have more in common than it might seem.
Legalism and Decisionism often share three key political assumptions that
are frequently overlooked. First, they are in agreement that emergencies
trigger a necessity for security measures that may curtail civil liberties.
Second, they perceive public enemies as distinct from private enemies. Third,
they share a vision of the future as a time when great catastrophes may occur
and thus attempt to tailor their approaches to prevent these future
catastrophes.
Can we articulate an approach to law's response to emergencies that does
not share these assumptions of necessity, enmity, and catastrophe? I argue
that we can, and that it is our responsibility to do so. I offer a third approach
that I call "Humanist Decisionism." This approach is humanist in that it
coming upon a situation of choice where governing norms contradict one another or 'run
out,' he refuses the enterprise of either repairing the discourse or replacing it with a new
discourse that will be more determinate.").
3 For an illuminating discussion of the history of the idea of the sovereign's absolute
power see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 48-49 (2008).
4 In the Revolutionary War Era, for example, such state departures from law were
sometimes legitimized through this type of reasoning. See, e.g., Report of the Committee
of the Council of Censors, 7 (Bailey ed., Phila. 1784) ("[Iln some instances, it is certainly
true, that the Constitution has been invaded through necessity in times of extreme danger,
when this country was involved in a very unequal struggle for life and liberty; and when
good men, were induced to hazard all consequences, for the sake of preserving our
existence as a people. Yet in a calm review of these proceedings, we think it proper to
advert even to such breaches of the Constitution, as have been occasioned by the
extremest necessity; least they should be brought into precedent, when no such necessity
shall exist."); see also Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1823,
1920 n.33 1 (2009) (citing a 1779 Pennsylvania statute that was "particularly candid about
its lawlessness," and explaining that "[ilnstead of lawfully suspending habeas, this sort of
statute unlawfully suspended a wide range of other laws, including constitutional
guarantees of judicial process"). I thank Philip Hamburger for calling my attention to the
pamphlet cited in this note.
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values the freedom needed for human flourishing, as do many Legalist
approaches, but it is Decisionist in that it recognizes the limits of legal norms
and the need for intuition-based decision-making in some situations.
Humanist Decisionism departs from both Legalism and Decisionism in its
attempt to replace the current prevailing politics of necessity, enmity, and
catastrophe shared by Legalism and Decisionism with a politics of friendship
and hospitality.
This Article proceeds as follows: Parts 11 and III elaborate the main
premises of Legalism and Decisionism in the context of emergency-powers
debates. Part IV examines three contemporary sites of Legalist and
Decisionist disputes: (1) "enemy combatant" detentions and the entitlement
to habeas corpus relief, (2) the meaning of the Suspension Clause; and (3') the
Cybersecurity Act of 2009, pending legislation that attempts to secure
cyberspace in times of emergency. Part V discusses the shared political
assumptions of Legalism and Decisionism. Part VI presents the main
premises of Humanist Decisionism and concludes with several normative
implications.
11. U.S. LEGALISM
The Legalist approach to emergency powers contends that
(1) emergencies can and should be governed by pre-determined legal norms
(hereinafter "rule of law"15); and (2) the executive branch, along with the
other two branches, is constrained by law in emergencies. 6
A. Supremacy of Law in Emergencies
Can the Constitution and other legal norms adequately guide
governmental responses to emergencies? The events of September 11, 2001
have triggered a lively and fascinating debate regarding the usefulness of pre-
determined legal norms (including the Constitution) in the management of
emergencies. 7 The jurisprudential dispute turns on whether emergencies, due
5 The term "rule of law" has many other meanings and has generated substantial
literature in several areas of legal scholarship, including jurisprudence. A locus classicus
is Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L.Q. REv. 195 (1977), reprinted in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (Keith Culver ed., 1999).
6 Some scholars may accept the first premise of Legalism but not the second. But
most Legalists. accept both premises, and thus the usual form of Legalism is considered
here.
7~ See generally David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 10 1 MIcH. L. REv. 2565 (2003); David Dyzenhaus,
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27
CARDozo L. REv. 2005 (2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
2010] 703
704 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
to their unique, unpredictable, and dangerous nature, trigger situations to
which ordinary legal norms cannot properly respond. I call this question
"jurisprudential" because its primary focus is on the nature of legal norms. In
other words, the question is not which branch of government should respond
to emergencies or whether the executive is bound in emergencies. (These
related 'issues are discussed separately below.) Rather, the question here is
whether emergencies actually challenge the very idea of the "rule of law."
Does law "run out" in emergencies? Can the governmental response to
emergencies be meaningfully guided by pre-existing legal norms?
The Legalist answer is yes. The respontse to emergencies must come
from within the law. However, there is a spectrum of Legalist positions
regarding what it actually means to respond to emergencies from within. Is it
enough that Congress passes a law that endorses executive action? Or is there
a deeper notion of legality that a democratic legal system should aspire to in
emergencies?
W~hile all Legalist approaches agree that the response to emergencies
must come from within the legal order, some Legalist positions have
conceded that emergencies are indeed unique situations that must trigger
specifically-tailored alternative legal regimes. 8 Other Legalist positions
disagree and posit that the ordinary legal order is adequately equipped to
respond to emergencies. These approaches emphasize a "substantive
conception of the rule of law that is appropriate at all times."9 David
Dyzenhaus, for example, argues that mere Congressional approval of
executive acts often falls short of a meaningful enforcement of the rule of
law. He argues that Congress itself should also be bound by a thick,
substantive concept of law.'10
Most Legalist positions agree that seepage from emergencies to normal
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror", 108 CoLUM. L. REv. 1013
(2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004); Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?. Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L.
REv. 273, 306 (2003).
8 See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030
(2003); Gross, supra note 7, at 1023.
9 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2037 (emphasis added). I have elsewhere explained
the excellent distinction offered by David Dyzenhaus between "rule of law" and "rule by
law." See Noa Ben-Asher, Legal Holes, 5 UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 15 (2009)
("[Legalist approaches] have accordingly articulated a helpful distinction between 'rule
by law' and 'rule of law.' The former typically refers to a situation in which the
legislature serves as a rubber stamp for executive action, and the latter-to a more robust
version of legality that maintains the core principles [of] the legal system. Congress
might authorize a variety of state actions that contradict basic principles of the legal
system.")
10 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2 037.
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times is among the serious dangers of extraordinary responses to
emergencies:
[A~n exceptional legal regime-alongside the ordinary one-. .. will permit
government to claim that it is acting according to law when it in effect has a
free hand and will, the longer the exceptional regime lasts, create the
problem of seepage of government outside of the rule of law into the
ordinary legal order.1
Seepage from emergencies to normal times results from the fact that "bright-
line demarcations between normalcy and emergency are all too frequently
untenable, and distinctions between the two made difficult, if not
impossible."' 2 Accordingly, "there is a strong probability that measures used
by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal system
even after the crisis has ended."113 In addition, "[e]mergency regimes tend to
perpetuate themselves, regardless of the intentions of those who originally
invoked them. Once brought to life, they are not so easily terminable."' 4
Legalists thus conclude that there is no place for extraordinary responses to
emergencies outside of the ordinary legal order.'15
Consequently, Legalists have argued that what has come to be known as
"grey and black holes" should be eliminated from the legal system. Black
holes "arise when statutes or legal rules 'either explicitly exempt[] the
I I Id at 2029.
12 Gross, supra note 7, at 1022.
13 Id at 1097.
14 I.at 1073. For example:
The State of Israel has been under an unremitting emergency regime since its
establishment in May 1948....
Similarly, when originally enacted by the British Parliament, the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922 was meant to last for
no more than one yer.... Subsequently, the Act was made permanent. The story of
the series of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts (PTA) was much
the same. Originally introduced in Parliament in 1974, it was amended in 1975 and
1983, and reenacted in 1984. In 1989, the PTA became a permanent part of the
statute books of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland itself has been the subject of
an emergency rule for a combined period of some thirty years.
Last, by the mid- I 970s, the United States had experienced four declared states
of emergency in force spanning a period of more than forty years. As a direct result,
more than 470 pieces of legislation, meant to apply only when a state of emergency
has been declared, could have been used by the government.
Id at 1073-75 (citations omitted).
15 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2029. We will later see that Gross offers a different
solution to the seepage problem from the one offered by Legalists. See infra Part II.B.
;010] 705
706 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
executive from the requirements of the rule of law or explicitly exclude[]
judicial review of executive action."' 16 And grey holes, in the context of
executive detention, are "space[s] in which the detainee has some procedural
rights but not rights sufficient for him effectively to contest the executive's
case for his detention." 17 Some Legalists view grey holes as more harmful
than black holes "because the procedural rights available to the detainee
cloak the lack of substance.. .. A little bit of legality can be more lethal to
the rule of law than none." 18 In other words, because law is not completely
absent in grey holes, a fagade of legality is preserved.' 9 Dyzenhaus has
correctly identified the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, as the twentieth-
century source of the idea of grey and black holes. 20 I will return to this issue
in Part 111.
Another Legalist argument for a thick, substantive notion of the rule of
law in emergencies has been articulated by Jenny Martinez. She writes,
[W]hen multiple decisions from the "war on terror" are put together ... one
begins to sense that something noteworthy is afoot. All of the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in the terrorism cases thus far have been focused on
questions of process, as have a great many of the lower court decisions.21
Martinez continues,
[T~he "war on terror" litigation in U.S. courts has been fixated on process to
a degree that is peculiar in both senses of that word-that is, there is a
pattern of focus-on-procedure-while-sidestepping-substance that is odd
enough to require explanation-and there is something particular about
16 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmitt ian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
1096 (2009) (taking these terms from DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW:
LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006)); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The
Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004)).
17 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2026.
18 Id
19 Id. at 2029.
20 I.at 2006.
21 Martinez, supra note 7, at 1015-16 (emphasis in original); see also Owen Fiss,
The War against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 235, 244-46
(2006) (arguing for more Supreme Court involvement in constitutional questions of
individual liberty). But see Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference
in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 663 (arguing that in a number
of post-9/1 1 decisions courts have put procedural devices to "surprisingly 'muscular'
uses," and that these decisions "illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural law
where the political branches fail to legislate or properly implement substantive law").
706 Vol. 71:4
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American legal culture at this moment in time that provides at least part of
that explanation. 22
Martinez criticizes the judicial side-stepping of substance, arguing that "the
focus on process rather than substance comes at a human cost,"2" and that
"the 'war on terror' litigation thus far seems to have resulted in a great deal
of process, and not much justice." 24
Notably, the Legalist claim that "[t]he Constitution can and does apply in
times of strife as well as peace, when the courts are open and when they are
not,"125 does not necessarily mean that the Constitution applies in the same
way at all times. As Trevor Morrison has argued, "Civil War precedents may
be a fruitful source of constitutional lessons for other emergency
circumstances. In particular, they may help us see that national emergencies
can warrant certain constitutional arrangements we would not otherwise
tolerate."26 So, although the Constitution applies at all times, in national
security emergencies a shift occurs in the balance between national security
and liberties.
In sum, Legalist positions agree that responses to emergencies should
come from within the law, either through existing Constitutional norms or by
the enactment of special emergency legislation. We will later see that
Decisionist approaches critically disagree with both of these Legalist
alternatives. Decisionists challenge Legalism by arguing that some
emergencies cannot and should not be regulated by statutory or constitutional
norms because they fall within the exceptional realm of executive decision-
making.
B. No Executive Branch Supremacy in Emergencies
The Legalist position regarding balance of powers is that "[tlhe
constitutional text requires members of Congress, the President, and all other
executive officials to pledge to uphold the Constitution. The duties thus
generated do not depend on judicial enforcement."127 And although much of
the decision-making in emergencies is executed by government officials
outside the courts, Legalists have also emphasized that courts must play a
22 Martinez, supra note 7, at 10 16.
23 Id. at 10 17.
24 Id at 1092.
25 Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 CoLum.
L. REv. 1533, 1616 (2007).
26 Id. at 1589.
27 Id at 1580 (citation omitted).
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central role in interpreting the Constitution. 28 In other words, the Legalist
position is that "legislative and executive branch fidelity to the Constitution
includes, but is not limited to, complying with judicial determinations of
unconstitutionality and, more generally, that the political branches should
take some account of judge-made constitutional doctrine when construing the
Constitution themselves." 29
Some Legalist approaches have prescribed robust judicial review of
executive decision-making. For example, David Cole writes:
It is in times of crisis that constitutional rights and liberties are most needed,
because the temptation to sacrifice them in the name of national security
will be at its most acute. To government officials, civil rights and liberties
often appear to be mere obstacles to effective protection of the national
interest.... Judicial protection is also critical because crisis measures are
typically targeted at the most vulnerable among us, especially noncitizens,
who have little or no voice in the political process.30
The protection of civil liberties in emergencies, according to Cole, should not
be left in the hands of the political branches. Were courts to adopt the
position that "extraconstitutional measures are appropriate during
emergencies, and that the only real check is political, much would be lost and
little gained in the protection of civil liberties." 3' Thus, although "courts are
undoubtedly highly imperfect[J," writes Cole, "the alternatives are worse.
One cannot rely on the executive branch to police itself in times of crisis."132
And while some Legalist approaches have prescribed robust judicial
review in times of crisis, others have focused on legislative authorization of
executive acts as the key to legitimacy. Geoffrey Stone, for example, has
pointed out in the context of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) that "the proper way-the legal way, the constitutional way-for the
President to address that question [of how to engage in more aggressive
foreign surveillance than FISA permits] is for him to go to Congress and seek
an amendment to FISA."13 3 Likewise, Stone writes regarding the seizing and
28 Id at 1582 ("Still, our constitutional traditions do call for preserving some central
role for the judiciary in constitutional interpretation. Recognizing that, courts and
scholars commonly regard constitutional interpretation as 'a collaborative enterprise in
which each branch .. . recognize[s] its own limitations and the relative strengths and
functions of the other coordinate branches,' but still accord the Supreme Court the final
say in the constitutional disputes that come before it." (citations omitted)).
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Cole, supra note 7, at 2567 (citation omitted).
31 Id. at 2587.
32Id. at 259 1.
33 Geoffrey Stone, Federalism: Executive Power in Wartime, 5 GEO J.L. & PUB.
708 Vol. 71:4
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detaining of Jos6 Padilla at O'Hare airport in Chicago:
[I]f the President wanted the power to do this, if he thought that the
circumstances facing the United States were so dire that he needed the
authority secretly to seize American citizens ... then he could have gone to
Congress and said 'I want this power.' Congress could then have decided
whether it was an appropriate power, and eventually the Court could have
decided whether that power violated due process.34
Others have also stressed the importance of the joint work of the political
branches in emergencies, arguing that judges do and should defer when the
political branches have worked in unison in emergency national security
matters. For example, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have argued
that
[c]ourts have developed a process-based, institutionally oriented (as
opposed to rights oriented) framework for examining the legality of
governmental action in extreme security contexts. Through this process-
based approach, American courts have sought to shift the responsibility for
these difficult decisions away from themselves and toward the joint action
of the most democratic branches of govemnment.35
Although the positions discussed above vary--especially in their
emphasis on judicial review in times of crisis-what makes all of them
Legalist for the purposes of this Article is that they all reject the Decisionist
claims that certain emergencies must fall completely outside the "rule of
law" and that the Legislature and the Judiciary must defer to the executive
branch in emergencies.
111. U.S. DECISIoNISM
In the years that followed the events of September 11, 2001, a
POL'Y 309, 323 (2007).
35 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency
Powers: The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L
J. CONS'r. L. 296, 297 (2004); see also Trevor Morrison, The Middle Ground in Judicial
Review of Enemy Combatant Detentions, 45 WILLAMET L. REv. 453, 456 (2009) (There
is a "middle approach that eschews conclusive constitutional judgments in either
direction. It neither categorically forbids certain government actions as violative of the
Constitution's individual rights provisions nor upholds such actions on theories of
unilateral, preclusive, executive power derived directly from the Constitution. Instead,
this approach encourages the legislative and executive branches to work together to
decide how best to balance liberty and security in times of national crisis, and
substantially defers to them when they do.").
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Decisionist approach crystallized in U.S. emergency-powers debates. The
two main jurisprudential premises of this approach are that: (1) emergencies
cannot be governed by the rule of law; and (2) the primary decision-maker in
emergencies is the executive branch. The main normative consequence of
these two claims is that courts and legislators do and should defer to the
executive branch in emergencies. This Part has three Sections. Section A
introduces the source of these Decisionist premises: the German legal
theorist Carl Schmitt. Sections B and C demonstrate how Schmitt's
jurisprudential claims about emergency powers have reappeared in
contemporary U.S. debates.
A. Background
The predecessor of U.S. Decisionism is the German legal scholar, Carl
Schmitt,36 who is often referred to as the father of twentieth-century legal
Decisionism.37 Schmitt was a law professor and a public-law theorist who
wrote extensively in the years of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) and
thereafter. Various scholars have acknowledged the relevance of Carl
Schmitt in contemporary emergency-powers debates.38
What this Article adds to this discussion are the following two insights.
First, we must distinguish between Carl Schmitt's jurisprudence and his
politics. Schmitt, his current supporters, and many of his past and current
opponents have, for the most part, conflated these two aspects of his
thinking. Part VI will argue that this conflation of politics and jurisprudence
has been a wise move for Schmitt and his current followers, and an
unfortunate one for his opponents. Second, this Article claims that current
SchmIittians have conveniently dropped Schmitt's more controversial claims
or those claims that would be unpopular in current U.S. legal-academic
discourse. They claim to have stripped Schmitt of "layers of interpretive
dross and continental conceptualisms," 39 and kept only his "important mid-
sized and largely institutional or empirical insights."140 Section C of this Part
identifies one of these "continental conceptualisms"-Schmitt's definition of
36 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2006-07; Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1089-99.
37 See Oren Gross, The Normiess and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's
Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception " Dichotomy, 21 CARDozo L.
REv. 1825, 1826 (2000).
38 David Abraham, The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral
Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 249, 263-65 (2008).
See generally Dyzenhaus, supra note 7; Vermeule. supra note 16.
39 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1100.
40 Id. at I1100-0 1.
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sovereignty-and argues that it cannot be easily "cleaned off'4' of Schmitt's
insights.42
Schmitt contended that decisions are superior to norms. 43 He claimed
that while "[e]very jurisprudential thought works with rules, as well as with
decisions ... only one of these can be the ultimate jurisprudentially formed
notion from which all the others are always juristically derived: either norm
. .. , or decision, or concrete order.""4 And for the Decisionist, Schmitt tells
us, "[wjhat matters for the reality of legal life is who decides."145 This is the
core of Schmittian Decisionism. According to Schmitt, while the Legalist
seeks the ideal of "substantive correctness," the Decisionist raises "the
question of competence."146 This means that the important question for the
Decisionist is not what the correct legal answer is, but which political actor is
best situated to decide how to act in any given situation. The key concepts
here are decision, competence, and concrete situations.
One of the main justifications for the superiority of decisions over norms,
under this view, is that "norms are valid only for normal situations, and the
presupposed normalcy of a situation is the positive-legal component of its
'validity. "','7 Schmitt insisted that "no norm can be valid in an entirely
abnormal situation."148 The norm, according to Schmitt, cannot address all
situations, and when it attempts to do so, "[ilt becomes senseless and
unconnected."149 The norm controls the situation "only so far as the situation
has not become completely abnormal."150 Consequently, "[b]ecause a general
norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass
a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be
entirely derived from this norm."51
41 Id at 1 100.
42 Elsewhere I have argued that Schmitt's utilization of theistic structures is also
critical for our current understanding of emergency powers. See Ben-Asher, supra note 9,
at 3.
43 CARL. SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 67 (George Schwab trans., Univ.
Chi. Press 2007) (1932) [hereinafter SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL].
44 CARL. SCHMITT, ON THE THREE TYPES OF JJRisTIC THOUGHT 43 (Joseph W.
Bendersky trans., Praeger Publishers 2004) (1934).
45 SCHMITT, POLITCAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 34 (emphasis added).
46 Id.
47'~ CARLu SCHMITTr, LEGALrrY AND LEGITIMACY 69 (Jeffr~ey Seitzer ed., trans., Duke
Univ. Press 2004) (1932).
48 SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 46.
49 SCHmiTT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 56.
50 Id
51 SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 6.
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But if norms cannot govem. a "real exception," then who can? Schmitt's
infamous answer is that the "[s]overeign is he who decides on the
exception." 52 To counter the Legalist assumption that law is sovereign at all
times (the rule-of-law principle), Schmitt claimed that whoever is authorized
within a legal order to declare a "real exception" is the true sovereign.53 And
Schmitt viewed emergencies as the ultimate exception "that makes relevant
the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty." 54
Emergencies are truly exceptional because "[tlhe precise details of an
emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place
in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency
and of how it is to be eliminated." 55 That is, whoever is authorized to declare
an emergency and decide how to respond to it, is the real (Schmittian)
sovereign. Thus, the declaration of the emergency is the core of politics and
the mark of sovereignty.
The sovereign declares that an emergency exists and decides how to act
in it because the role of the state, according to Schmitt, consists above all "in
assuring total peace within the state and its territory."156 Hence "the lawmaker
under normal circumstances is something different than the special
commissioner of the abnormal situation who reestablishes normalcy ... .5
And constitutional protections should not apply in emergencies because the
Constitution is only "the expression of the societal order, the existence of
society itself. As soon as it is attacked the battle must then be waged outside
the constitution and the law, hence decided by the power of weapons." 58
B. Extra-Legality in Emergencies
Current Decisionist theories have taken up Carl Schmitt's theories to
challenge the notion that the rule of law is applicable at all times. Adrian
Vermeule, for example, explicitly uses Schmitt's insights to argue that U.S.
administrative law has "built right into its structure, a series of legal 'black
holes' and 'grey holes."' 59 Based on a study of post-September I11 appellate
52 Id. at 5.
53 Id at 6.
54 Id
55 Id at 6-7.
56 Id. at 46.
57 SCHmITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 69; see also
SCHMrTT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 46 ("Every norm presupposes a normal
situation, and no norm can be valid in an entirely abnormal situation.").
58 ScHmrrr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 47 (emphasis added) (quoting
Lorenz von Stein, Geschichte Der Sozialen Bewegung, in FRANKREICH 1, DER BERGRIFF
DER GESELLSCHAFT 494 (Munich, Drei Masken Verlag 192 1)).
59 Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1096 (citations omitted). For definitions of grey and
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decisions involving matters of national security, Vermeule argues that "quite
ordinary administrative law doctrines, such as 'arbitrary and capricious'
review of agency policy choices and factual findings, function as grey holes
during times of war and real or perceived emergency." 60 These
administrative law doctrines are "grey holes" in the sense that they "represent
adjustable parameters that courts can and do use to dial up or dial down the
intensity of judicial review, as wars, security threats and emergencies come
and go."61 "Grey holes," according to Vermeule, are significantly different
from "black holes" in that "even when the parameter is adjusted down near
zero-even when the intensity of review is very weak-the fag~ade of
lawlikeness is preserved."162
However, and this is the essence of U.S. Decisionism, "grey and black
holes" are not only integral to administrative law, "[ilndeed they are
inevitable; no legal order governing a massive and massively diverse
administrative state can hope to dispense with them, although their scope will
wax and wane as time and circumstances dictate."163 Vermeule argues that
grey and black holes demonstrate the Schmittian insight that because
"[elmergencies cannot realistically be governed by ex ante, highly specified
rules, but at most by vague ex post standards[,] it is beyond the institutional
capacity of lawmakers to specify and allocate emergency powers in all future
contingencies."164 Vermeule therefore critiques "[tlheorists of the thick rule
of law," who are "wrong in thinking that anything can be done about this
state of affairs."65 Rather, "we should recognize that the APA and its
accumulated doctrines and practices are, and always will be, our Schmittian
administrative law."166 Therefore:
[Plractically speaking, legislators in particular will feel enormous pressure
to create vague standards and escape hatches-for emergencies and
otherwise-in the code of legal procedure that governs the mine run of
ordinary cases in the administrative state, because legislators know they
cannot subject the massively diverse body of administrative entities to
tightly specified rules, and because they fear the consequences of lashing
the executive too tightly to the mast in future emergencies. 67
black holes, see supra notes 16, 17 and accompanying text.60 Id. at 1118.
61 Id
62 Id
6 3 Id at 1149.
64Id at 1101.
65 Vermneule, supra note 16, at 1149.
6 6 Id.
6 1Id at 1101.
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The allusion to Odysseus in the last sentence is a noteworthy inversion of the
epic story. In Vermeule's telling, tying the executive to the mast may cause
or exacerbate future disasters. In Homer's telling, Odysseus's being tied to
the mast enabled him to avoid the disaster of being lured to his death.68
More importantly, it is critical to see here that in this clever theoretical
move Decisionism legalizes extra-legality: it founds unbound executive
power not in the executive itself but in a legislative act by Congress.
Vermeule claims that deference to the executive in emergencies through
"grey and black"' holes was set up by Congress in the APA and is therefore
legal. The term "black and grey holes" is preceded by the word "legal"
throughout his text to signal that these are not just holes in a legal system-
these are legal holes in a legal system.69 So although black holes "exempt the
executive from the requirements of the rule of law,"70 and grey holes are
disguised black holes,7 ' the text underscores that these lawless holes are
"legal." Grey and black holes under this Decisionist view are therefore better
understood as law's self-suspending mechanisms. 72
Mark Tushnet and Oren Gross have also taken the position that the rule
of law recedes in emergencies. Under Gross's "Extra-Legal Measures
Model" 73 public officials may respond extra-legally to emergencies if they
"believe that such action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public
in the face of calamity, provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge
the nature of their actions."74 Gross argues that publicity may provide more
transparency and the uncertainty of the outcomes may limit public officials'
temptation to act hastily.75 Likewise, Mark Tushnet has argued for an
68 1 thank Kent McKeever for bringing this point to my attention.
69 For further elaboration of this point, see Ben-Asher, supra note 9, at 1-3.
70 Id. at 1.
71 Id.
72 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1, 1-2 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005);
Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2006 ("One curious feature of states of emergency is that
they are brought into being by law."); David DyZenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality, in
EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 33 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008).
73 Gross, supra note 7, at 1097. Gross bases his model on three propositions: (1)
emergencies create a need for extraordinary responses (i.e., Carl Schmitt's theory of the
emergency); (2) historically, constitutional considerations have not significantly
constrained governments in cases of emergencies; and (3) there is a strong probability
that measures used by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal
system even after the crisis. Id.
74 Id. at 1023, 1111-15. Public officials should also be required to disclose the
nature of their activities and hope for "ex post" judicial, executive, or legislative
ratification.
7 5 OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AoLAiN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY
POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 155-56 (2006); Gross, supra note 7, at 1123-25.
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affirmative recognition of extraconstitutional emergency powers; Tushnet
writes that "it is better to have emergency powers exercised in an
extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands that the actions Are
extraordinary, than to have the actions rationalized away as consistent with
the Constitution and thereby normalized."176
Notably, what this Article calls U.S. Decisionism is different from what
Cass Sunstein has called the "minimalist approach." Although both
minimalism and Decisionism agree that judges should play a minimalist role
in emergencies, they significantly diverge on the ultimate decision-maker in
emergencies. The minimalist approach recognizes that the Constitution "does
not give a general 'war power' to the President" and that "[w]ith respect to
war, the Constitution is easily read to give the national legislature the
primary role."177 In contrast, the Decisionist approach views the President
and the executive branch as the primary decision-makers in emergencies.78
So whereas both minimalism and Decisionism argue for a limited role for
courts in emergencies, minimalism is still Legalist in the sense that it places
the ultimate authority in the legislature, whereas Decisionism places the
ultimate authority in the realm of executive decision.
C. Executive Branch Supremacy in Emergencies
Current Decisionist scholars have consistently repeated the argument that
courts and legislators do and should defer to the President and the executive
branch in emergencies. Under this view, the President and the executive
branch are, and should be, the primary decision-makers in national security
emergencies. Thus, some current Decisionists self-identify as
"deferentialists."179 They have generally argued that in reality "courts defer
heavily to government in times of emergency, either by upholding
government's action on the merits, or by ducking hard cases that might
require ruling against the government."180
76 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 306.
77 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 109 ("National Security Maximalism neglects
institutional factors that create a grave risk that the executive branch will support
unjustified intrusions on civil liberties. Group polarization is a significant danger,
particularly for a branch specifically designed to consist of like-minded people. As a
result, the executive might well support interferences with freedom that are not
adequately justified by security concerns. This is especially likely if those interferences
affect identifiable groups rather than the public as a whole.").
78 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A
Reply to Lawson, 87 B.U. L. REv. 313, 314 (2007) ("[Bjut to whom is that deference
owed? Congress or the President? On our theory, the answer is the President.").
80 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 16.
2010] 715
716 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
1. Three Justi~fi cations for Deference to the Executive Branch
Decisionists have offered three different types of justifications for
deference to the executive branch in emergencies: institutional competence,
epistemnic deference, and historical precedent. I will briefly discuss each.
First, Decisionists argue that deference shows that "[legislators and
judges understand that the executive's comparative institutional advantages
in secrecy, force, and unitariness are all the more usefuil during emergencies,
so that it is worthwhile transferring more discretion to the executive even if it
results in an increased risk of executive abuse."181 In other words, "the real
cause of deference to government in times of emergency is institutional: both
Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive during emergencies
because of the executive's institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and
decisiveness." 82 In contrast to courts and legislators who cannot properly
respond to emergencies, the government is a speedy, secret, and decisive
actor. Judges and legislators may also "lack confidence-and may be right to
lack confidence-that they know enough about the consequences of
particular measures taken for the protection of national security to be able to
strike a proper balance."83 Judges are "not experts on national security in
general or the terrorist threat in particular." 84 Judges are institutionally
inferior decision-makers in national security emergencies because "the
judiciary, unlike the executive and legislative branches, has no machinery for
s .ystematic study of the problem,"85 and because judges are generalists,
meaning that "[c]ases involving national security are only a tiny part of their
docket. They cannot afford to devote much time to them."86
The second justification for deference to the executive branch is
"epistemic." "Epistemically humble judges," write Vermeule and Eric
81 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
865, 893 (2007); see also Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference The Judicial
Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IowA L. REv. 1723, 1750 (2007)
("[IUndeed, one does see particularly robust examples of deference at both the district-
and circuit-court levels in national-security-related cases during this period.").
82 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added).
8 3 RICHA{RD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 35 (Geoffr~ey R. Stone ed., 2006).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 35-36 ("Its staffs are small. It has to wait until it has a case to begin its
inquiry into the facts and policy ramifications, and the pressure of its caseload requires it
to decide the case without being able to take the time to study background and
circumstances and likely consequences.").
86 Id. at 36.
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Posner, "should not require statutory authorization for emergency action by
the President."187 Vermeule defines "epistemic deference":
Epistemic deference is deference to expert judgment about whether a certain
state offacts exist, while authority-based deference is deference to an agent
empowered by some higher source of law to choose a policy or establish a
rule, even or especially if there is no fact of the matter or right answer about
which policyor rule is best under the circumstances. 88
Epistemic deference has to do with knowledge of certain facts that the
deferring judge allegedly has limited or no access to.89 Vermeule has
recently argued that Holmes's approach to emergencies was that of.
".epistemic deference," and that the Holmesian version of "epistemic
deference" correlates with the Holmesian view of the emergency as a pure
question of fact.90 This means that emergencies are objective, factual
realities, and that the executive branch knows much more about whether or
not they exist.91
As a final justification for deference, Decisionist scholars have
underscored that in the course of U.S. history courts have always deferred to
the executive branch in emergencies, and that this is a good thing. For
example, during the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus,
allowing the Secretary of War to detain 13,000 northern civilians, most of
them political opponents of the war.92 The arrests were either made without
charges or were for vaguely defined offenses created by executive decrees.
During World War 11, approximately 120,000 individuals of Japanese origin
(some of whom were American citizens) were interned in camps on the basis
of military orders.93 An exemplary Decisionist summary of the history of
emergencies in the U.S. is the following:
87 Posner & Vermneule, supra note 78, at 316.
88 Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REv. 163, 169 (2008)
(emphasis added).
89 Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1061, 1085
(2008).
90 Vermneule, supra note 88, at 164.
91 Id. In addition, "[ojther reasons for deference include the President's ability to act
more quickly and decisively and with secrecy, and the tendency of the public to rally
around the President." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 78, at 316.
92 For a historical account of Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and the
consequent ruling by Chief Justice Robert Taney that the executive order was
unconstitutional because only Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, see
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERiLOUS TIES: FREE SPEECH iN WARTimE 84-88 (2004).
93 See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 755, 781 (2004) ("The Court tends to uphold
arguably unconstitutional detentions during national security emergencies, deferring to
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[I]t is natural, inevitable, and desirable for power to flow to this branch of
government. Congress rationally acquiesces; courts rationally defer. Civil
liberties are compromised because civil liberties interfere with effective
response to the threat; but civil liberties are never eliminated because they
remain important for the well-being of citizens and the effective operation
of the government.... Both Congress and the judiciary realize that they do
not have the expertise or the resources to correct the executive during an
emergency. Only when the emergency wanes do these institutions reassert
themselves, but this just shows that the basic constitutional structure
remains unaffected by the emergency. 94
In contrast with the view that underscores the grave harms to civil rights
during historical emergencies, the Decisionist position is that "the history is
largely one of political and constitutional success."195 This is so because "[iln
the United States, unlike in many other countries, the constitutional system
has never collapsed during an emergency."196
In sum, based on (1) institutional; (2) epistemic; and (3) historical
justifications for deference, the current Decisionist view is that during
emergencies "it is important that power be concentrated."197 Power should
flow "up from the states to the federal government and, within the federal
government, from the legislature and the judiciary to the executive." 98
Decisionists have criticized courts when they did not defer to government in
national security issues, and praised them when they did.99
the Executive's affirmnations of the necessity of detentions.").
94 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 4.
95 Id
96 Id
97 Id at 15-16.
98 Id at 16.
99 See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CoNST. COMMENT. 179, 205
(2006) ("[U]ntil Hamdan, the Supreme Court remained respectful of the President and
Congress's efforts to set wartime policy on the prosecution and punishment of enemy war
crimes. .. . The Court used to defer to the working arrangement between the other
branches to protect national security and carry out war by deferring to the executive's
interpretation of foreign affairs laws."); Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Katz and the War
on Terrorism, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1219, 1239 (2008) (Courts have deferred to the
executive branch's "authority to conduct warrantless searches for foreign intelligence
purposes" because "the executive can more fully assess the requirements of national
security than can the courts, and because the President has a constitutional duty to protect
national security, courts should not attempt to constrain his authority to conduct
warrantless intelligence searches."); John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Harrdan v.
Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 83, 83, 104 (2006) (The Court's decision in
Hamdan "ignores the basic workings of the American separation of powers and will
hamper the ability of future presidents to respond to emergencies and war with the
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2. A Question of Sovereignty
Although current Decisionist approaches have attempted to brush off
some of Schmitt's "continental conceptualisms,"100 we must remember that
what was at stake for Schmitt in Political Theology and other texts written in
the 1920's and 1930's was the issue of sovereignty. Schmitt's primary
concern was not how to deal with emergencies. It was how to conceptualize
sovereignty.
Schmitt wrote these texts in a time when legal realists in Europe and the
United States were increasingly disillusioned by various promises of
parliamentary democracy. In particular, two main insights recur in Schmitt's
legal realism. First, with the immense population growth in Europe and in the
United States and the inevitable growth of the administrative state, it was
becoming clear that for the management of large populations, much
lawmaking must be done by administrative agencies that were politically
appointed rather than elected by the people. Second, these growing
populations mostly had no real engagement with politics, and therefore the
myth of democratic governance by the people had turned into, at best, the
ability to vote. Schmitt and other legal realists (on the left and right) realized
that what matters in liberal-democracies, more than sovereignty of the
people, is how best to manipulate public opinion.
So at a time when the rule of law was under attack from both right and
left, Schmitt sought to return to another theory of sovereignty: one that
predated that of the "sovereignty of law." His theory was that the actual
sovereign is not the law, but whoever can decide to put the law on hold: the
President. Thus, emergencies served as a test-case for his claim that law can
never really be sovereign.
Today, too, the stakes for Decisionists might be higher than they seem.
Current Decisionist arguments for deference in "legal grey and black holes"
are inspired by the Schmittian-Decisionist proposition that "what matters for
the reality of legal life is who decides."' 0 ' This is why the term
"Decisionism" best captures the gist of this approach. Sovereignty is, just as
it was for Schmitt, a matter of decision, competence, and concrete situations.
In emergencies, the most competent institution to make those decisions,
according to current Decisionists, is the executive branch. The Decisionist
thus breaks from the Legalist in that, for the Decisionist, decisions, and not
norms, are what ultimately must secure the nation.
forcefulness and vision of a Lincoln or an FDR.... [T~he Founders entrusted the
president with the primary responsibility, and therefore the power, to use military force in
situations of emergency." (emphasis added)).
100 Vermneule, supra note 16, at 1100.
101 ScHmImr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 2, at 34 (emphasis added).
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[V. SITES OF LEGALIST AND DECISIONIST DEBATES
Legalism and Decisionism are the two prevalent ways of thinking about
emergency powers. Among the multiple contemporary sites of disputes
between Legalists and Decisionists, here I focus on three. Section A
considers the status of "enemy combatants" in the ongoing "war on terror" as
it culminated in the Court's decision in Boumediene v, Bush.102 Section B
examines a debate in legal academia regarding the meaning of the
Suspension Clause. And Section C anticipates a future site of
Legalist/Decisionist debates: cybersecurity.
Read together, these three examples demonstrate how current
emergency-powers debates turn on the two main issues raised in Parts 11 and
111: (1) Can and should the "rule of law" apply at all times; and (2) who
should be the main decision-maker in emergencies? Part V will argue that
this narrow framing of the debates overlooks a set of political assumptions
shared by both approaches.
A. Present: Enemy Combatant Detentions
In the "war on terror" declared shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks, the legality of the Bush administration's detention policies was
challenged. An important issue in a line of cases leading up to Boumediene v.
Bush was whether any body of law (international or domestic) was applicable
to these detentions. 103 Although Legalist and Decisionist approaches
surfaced throughout this litigation, this Article focuses on their
manifestations in Boumediene, where non-citizens detained as "enemy
combatants" at Guantanamo Bay petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.
1. The Legalist Boumnediene Majority
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene echoes the two dominant
themes of the current Legalist approach to emergency powers. First,
"extraordinary times" do not nece 'ssitate the suspension of ordinary laws.
Second, national security matters are governed by the rule of law, and courts
will ultimately decide how to apply the laws.
First, by dismissing an alternative legal scheme set up by the political
branches to determine the status of "enemy combatants," the Boumediene
decision placed executive detentions back within the ordinary legal order.
102 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
103 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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The Court held that petitioners did "have the habeas corpus privilege,"'104 and
that the procedures provided by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (DTA) were "not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas
corpus." 05 Therefore, Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA) "operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ." 106
The Court could have adopted a minimalist approach, addressing only
the constitutionality of the specific statutes in question (the MCA and the
DTA),107 but the decision is instead signed with a significantly broader
Legalist declaration that "[tihe laws and Constitution are designed to survive,
and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be
reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of
the law."' 08 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that "[t]he political branches,
consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve
constitutional values while protecting the Nation from terrorism."109
Kennedy's opinion manifests the Legalist position that national security
matters are governed by the rule of law. Accordingly, the government's
argument that Guantanamo is beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts was
dismissed by the Court because, "by surrendering formal sovereignty over
any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the same time entering
into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the United
States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without legal
constraint" 1I10
Second, whereas all three branches are governed by law, judges (and not
the executive branch) have the final word on "what the law is":
104 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
105 Id.
106 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
107 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 103.
108 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798. This language echoes the dissenting opinion of
Justice Murphy in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (arguing that the
exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast area under the theory of
military necessity "goes over the 'very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the
ugly abyss of racism"). Murphy's dissent stressed that "[iindividuals must not be left
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither
substance nor support," and that "the military claim must subject itself to the judicial
process of having its reasonableness determnined and its conflicts with other interests
reconciled." Id at 234.
109 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
110 Id at 765 ("Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are
not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the
Constitution."').
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Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial
governance is one thing. To hold the political branches have the power to
switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite another.... The latter
would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government,
leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say
"what the law is."t 111
Kennedy's opinion dismisses the fundamental principle of the Decisionist
position-that the "war on terror" should be governed by executive decision-
making. He instead sends a plain warning to the political branches that the
Court will not be zoned out of the decision-making process in national
security matters. Times have changed: "[b]ecause our Nation's past military
conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to
pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this
luxury." 9912
In sum, Kennedy's position in Boumediene echoes the two core Legalist
principles: (1) the law, not the unbound decisions of the executive branch,
will govern in emergencies; and (2) the three branches are individually bound
by law, and judges provide the authoritative interpretation of the
Constitution.
2. The Decision ist Boumediene Dissent
In contrast, the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia in Boumediene reflect the Decisionist approach to emergency powers.
First, ordinary laws should not apply in extraordinary situations. Second, the
executive branch should be the primary decision-maker in emergencies.
First, the underlying premise of the Boumediene dissenters is that
ordinary laws, and in this case the privilege of habeas corpus, do not apply in
extraordinary situations as they would in ordinary situations. Whereas
Kennedy's opinion broadly frames the issue as "whether [the detainees] have
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn
I Id. (emphasis added). A similar position was taken by Justice O'Connor in
Hamdi v. Rumnsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) ("We necessarily reject the
Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily
circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the
courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the
legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of
separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch
of government. We have long made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.").
112 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797-98.
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except in conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I,- 113 for the
dissenters the question is about the habeas privileges of "aliens detained by
this country as enemy combatants." 114 This framing of the question is
dramatized in Scalia's opening pronouncement that "for the first time in our
Nation's history, the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on
alien enemies detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an
ongoing war."115 Scalia's Decisionist position (which Roberts joins) is that
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens
abroad; the Suspension Clause thus has no application, and the Court's
intervention in this military matter is entirely ultra vires. "116
Chief Justice Roberts adds that "contrary to the repeated suggestions of
the majority, DTA review need not parallel the habeas privileges enjoyed by
noncombatant American citizens.... It need only provide process adequate
for noncitizens detained as alleged combatants."-117 That is, whereas the
majority viewed habeas corpus as a general privilege that applies to all
individuals under U.S. sovereignty, the dissenters in fact assert different
degrees of habeas corpus privileges, emphasizing that "the critical threshold
question in these cases, prior to any inquiry about the writ's scope, is whether
the system the political branches designed protects whatever rights the
detainees may possess."" 8 According to this Decisionist approach, we are
not in the realm of "traditional habeas corpus," which applies in "normal
times" to U.S. citizens and "takes no account of what Hamdi recognized as
the 'uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict."' 9 The dissenters underscore the overall inadequacy of
Legalism when "America is at war with radical Islamists,"' 20 asserting that
"[t]he dangerous mission assigned to our forces abroad is to fight terrorists,
not serve subpoenas."' 2 ' In such times, the Court "most tragically .. . sets our
military commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court, under
13I.at 732.
11 4 Id at 801 (Roberts, CIJ, dissenting).
115 Id at 826-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
116 Id at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Id at 815 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
118 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, CIJ, dissenting).
"19 Id at 812 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hamndi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
533 (2004)); see also id at 813 ("The question is whether the CSRT procedures-
coupled with the judicial review specified by the DTA.-provide the 'basic process'
Hamdi said the Constitution affords American citizens detained as enemy combatants.").
120 Id at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121 Id at 816 (Roberts, CIJ, dissenting).
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whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence supports
the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner."' 22
Second, the dissenters in Boumediene expressed the Decisionist position
that courts should defer to the executive branch in matters of national
security, primarily due to institutional competence. 23 With regard to the
majority's holding that the government "presents no credible arguments that
the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus
courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims," Justice Scalia asks,
"What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of
Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever." 124 Thus, "as
today's opinion makes unnervingly clear, how to handle enemy prisoners in
this war will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the
national security concerns that the subject entails."'125 And Scalia warns that
"[tlhe game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly
cause more Americans to be killed." 126
Further, Roberts writes that in reality judges usually defer to the
executive branch on issues of national security and therefore the majority's
attempt to enforce its version of legality by granting the habeas corpus
privilege is "fruitless. 127 The majority opinion "shift[s] responsibility for
those sensitive foreign policy and national security decisions from the elected
122 Id. at 850 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123 An elaborate version of the Decisionist argument for executive competence is
found in Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Hamdi: "This detention falls squarely
within the Federal Government's war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to
second-guess that decision." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507. 579 (2004) (Thomas, I.,
dissenting); id. at 580-81 ("The Founders intended that the President have primary
responsibility-along with the necessary power-to protect the national security and to
conduct the Nation's foreign relations. They did so principally because the structural
advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these domains. 'Energy in the executive
is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection
of the community against foreign attacks.' The principle 'ingredient' for 'energy in the
executive' is 'unity.' . . . This is because '[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterise the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than
the proceedings of any greater number.' . . . These structural advantages are most
important in the national-security and foreign-affairs contexts. 'Of all the cares or
concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."' (citation omnitted)).
124 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 Id at 827-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 I.at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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branches to the Federal Judiciary." 28 However, "the habeas process the
Court mandates will most likely end up looking a lot like the DTA system it
replaces, as the district court judges shaping it will have to reconcile review
of the prisoners' detention with the undoubted need to protect the American
people from the terrorist threat.... 1"129
Finally, in a Decisionist governmental response to Boumediene, Attorney
General Mukasey asserted that it is not the "most prudent course" to leave to
the courts the resolution of the questions that remain after Boumediene, and
that "[u]nless Congress acts, the lower federal courts will determine the
specific procedural rules that will govern the more than 200 cases that are
now pending."' 30 The political branches, and not the judiciary, said
Mukasey, "are affirmatively charged by our Constitution with protecting
national security, are expert in such matters[,] and are in the best position to
weigh the difficult policy choices that are posed by these issues." 131
Thus, in sharp contrast to the majority's Legalist position, the dissent's
Decisionist position is that (1) ordinary legal principles may not apply in
extraordinary situations; and (2) the executive branch should be the primary
decision-maker in the "war on terror."
B. Past: The Meaning of the Suspension Clause
A key context in which the question of black holes arises is the
Suspension Clause,132 which has been understood by many as the
Constitution's "express provision for [the] exercise of extraordinary authority
because of a crisis."13 3 What does a suspension allow the political branches
to do in emergencies? Does it temporarily suspend judicial review? Or does
it temporarily suspend the law, thus allowing for detentions that would
otherwise be unlawful? For example, would a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus after September 11, 2001 have authorized executive detentions
of individuals merely "on suspicion that they might engage in future acts of
terrorism? 134 Decisionists and Legalists diverge on this question. The
128 Id.
130 Michael B.V. Mukasey, Att'y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008) (transcript
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-opa-633 .html.).
131 Id
132 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cI. 2 ("T'he Privilege or the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.").
133 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
134 Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 603
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Decisionist position is that legal norms are indeed suspended if the
Suspension Clause is activated. Legalists disagree, claiming that the
Suspension Clause is only a temporary suspension of judicial review.
1. The Legalist Position
In Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, Trevor Morrison
utilizes the two prongs of the Legalist position to explain the meaning of the
Suspension Clause. 135 He argues that (1) the rule of law applies at all times;
and (2) although all three branches are bound by the rule of law, courts have
the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution. 13 6
First, Morrison argues that because the rule of law applies at all times,
congressional suspension of habeas corpus does not convert an otherwise
unlawful detention into a lawful one. Executive actors must conform to legal
norms even when the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Morrison
recognizes that "periods of extreme national crisis may warrant construing
certain constitutional norms in a more flexible mode, thus affording the
government a broader range of action in the service of the compelling
interest in national security."' 37 However, he writes, "they do not create
grounds for simply ignoring those constitutional norms altogether.
Constitutional law's response to emergency is from within the law, not
without it."1138
Second, Morrison underscores that the rule of law binds executive actors
even when judges cannot temporarily enforce it. Judges are not the only
implementers of the Constitution, and the unreviewable status of an
executive act cannot serve to legitimize it. Thus, "during periods of
suspension, executive actors can implement constitutional norms outside the
courts. We should require them to do so, or at least recognize that not doing
so entails acting unconstitutionally." 139 Even when courts cannot enforce the
law, all legal actors are guided by their interpretation.'140
2. The Decisionist Position
In Suspension as an Emergency Power, Amanda Tyler disagrees with
Morrison. Tyler offers a Decisionist interpretation of the Suspension Clause.
(2009).
135 See Morrison, supra note 25, at 1580, 1616.
137Id at 1615-16.
138 Id. at 1616.
140 See id at 1582.
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She argues that (1) civil rights can be fully suspended in emergencies; and (2)
in such times of suspension, the executive branch is the primary decision-
maker, and its decisions are not bound by legal norms. 14 1
This view offers a broad interpretation of the Suspension Clause. It
argues that "the Suspension Clause recognizes an extraordinary emergency
power, one that does not simply remove a judicial remedy but 'suspends' the
rights that find meaning and protection in the Great Writ." 142 Under this
view, a detention pursuant to a valid suspension of habeas corpus cannot be
legally challenged.' 43 This broad interpretation of the Suspension Clause is
based on "the consistent understanding of suspension in this country ... that
comprehends a proper exercise of the power as expanding executive power
while 'suspending' those rights that find protection and meaning in the Great
Writ," and thus, "although our tradition views imprisonment without due
process of law as anathema, in the vein of William Blackstone, it nonetheless
recognizes that 'sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this may be
a necessary measure."' 144 Accordingly, "in a situation of 'extreme
emergency,' a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus calls
on the nation to 'part[] with its liberty for a while, in order to preserve it
forever.""145
Notably, Tyler's position does not follow the second prong of
Decisionism-she does not argue for deference to the executive branch.
While Tyler takes the Decisionist view that the rule of law can be suspended
in emergencies, she warns that "exercises of the power must be closely
guarded and carefully checked to ensure that the power is not invoked except
in the most dire of national emergencies."'14 6 Accordingly, "the executive
should not (save possibly in extraordinary and temporary circumstances) be
permitted to declare unilaterally that existing circumstances warrant a
suspension,"'14 7 and "Congress, the branch closest to the people, must agree
that circumstances warrant taking the dramatic step of suspending the
writ." 14 8 In addition, "a decision by the political branches to invoke the
authority should not be understood as categorically immune from judicial
141 See Tyler, supra note 134, at 609.
12I.at 603; see also Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension A Political Question?, .59
STAN. L. REv. 3 33, 3 86 (2006).
14 David Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention. Another View, 82
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 59, 86 (2006).
144 Tyler, supra note 134, at 605.
145 Id at 605-06 (quoting WILLIAm BLAcKSToNE, COMMENTARIEs, * 136).
46d.at 687.
14 7 Id.
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review." 149 The Article nonetheless classifies this approach as "Decisionist"
because it recognizes the creation of a black hole as the inevitable
consequence of a lawful suspension under the Suspension Clause, and
because it does not shy away from the possibility of extra-legality in
emergencies. As such, this approach incorporates the Schmittian insight that
in times of emergency, "the battle must .. . be waged outside the constitution
and the law."' 50
C. Future: The New Frontier of Cybersecurity
Legalist and Decisionist debates about emergency powers are likely to
continue in the future. One emerging site of Legalist/Decisionist conflict is
the regulation of cyberspace. In 2008, then-candidate Obama warned that
terrorists "could use our computer networks to deal us a crippling blow." 51
Obama promised to "make cyber security the top priority that it should be in
the 21st century."' 52 A current bill called the Cybersecurity Act of 2009
indeed declares that "America's failure to protect cyberspace is one of the
most urgent national security problems facing the county.... [O]nly a
comprehensive national security strategy. ... will make us more secure."153
1. The Decisionist Proposal
The Decisionist focus on the declaration of emergencies is manifested in
a bill introduced by Senators Jay Rockefeller (D-WrV) and Olympia Snowe
(R-ME) in April of 2009.154 The draft of the Cybersecurity Act of 2009
authorizes the President to "declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the
limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any compromised
Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information
system or network."' 55 The term "critical infrastructure information systems
'
4 9 Id. at 606.
150 SCHmImr, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 47.
151 Barack Obama, Speech at Purdue University (July 16, 2008) (transcript available
at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16807/barack-obamas speech-at-the-university _of purd
ue.html (last visited Aug. 19, 20 10)).
15 Cybersecurity Act, S. 773, 111 th Cong. §§ 2(l), 2(1 1)(c) (2009).
15 Id. Currently, government responsibility for cybersecurity is split: The Pentagon
and the National Security Agency safeguard military networks, while the Department of
Homeland Security provides assistance to private networks.
15 Cybersecurity Act § 18(2); see also Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, Senate
Legislation Would Federalize Cybersecurity; Rules for Private Networks Also Proposed,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A4.
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and networks" is broadly defined to include "[s]tate, local, and
nongovernmental information systems and networks in the United States
designated by the President as critical infrastructure information systems and
networks."' 56 This Act, if passed, will authorize the President to shut down
all of cyberspace, government and private, upon a decision that an
emergency exists. There are no guidelines as to what constitutes an
emergency. The legislation also establishes a "Cyber Czar" within the
Executive Office of the President and a number of new Department of
Commerce-related action items under the purview of the Cyber Czar.'157
A report published by the Congressional Research Service to accompany
this proposed initiative voices the justifications of the Decisionist position
discussed in Part III regarding executive competence in emergencies.' 58
According to the report, "strong justifications support the assertion that the
executive branch is best suited to take reasonable and necessary actions to
defend the country against cyber-based threats."'159 The first justification
"6stems from the broad diversity of cybersecurity threats: the President is
arguably best positioned to take a leadership role or create a uniform
response to span the range of cyber vulnerabilities."16 0 In addition, "the
executive branch is likely most able to integrate intelligence-gathering,
military, and other vehicles for addressing the cybersecurity challenge."' 6 '
The report concludes that "multiple policy considerations, including the
novel and dispersed nature of cyber threats, might justify an executive-led
response to cybersecurity."'162
2. The Legalist Opposition
The legislation was immediately criticized for shifting too much power
to the President. As one critic writes, "The Internet-arguably the most
empowering and important innovation of the modemn era-is in danger of
being stifled by the heavy hand of government control."'163 The bill,
156 Cybersecurity Act § 23 (3)(B).
157 R. Michael Senkowski & Mimi W. Dawson, Cybersecurity: A Briefing-Part II,
METRO. CORP. CouNs., Aug. 2009, at 34.
158 See John Rollins & Anna C. Henning, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative: Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations, CONG. RES. SERV., Mar. 20,
2009, at 8.
'
59 Id. at 17.
160Id
161 Id
162 Id. at 18.
163 Bob Barr, Cyber Bill Squelches Speech, Curtails Liberty, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 20, 2009, at A 18.
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according to other critics, "risks giving the federal government
unprecedented power over the Internet without necessarily improving
security in the ways that matter most."116 4 The bill grants "deeply troubling
powers over private-sector use of the Internet that should bother every user
and purveyor of Internet services." 165
This concentration of emergency powers in the President, according to
some Legalist critics, threatens individual privacy and liberty. Thus,
opponents of the bill explain that "[s]ince many of our critical infrastructure
systems ... are in the hands of the private sector, the bill would create a
maj or shift of power away from users and companies to the federal
government. This is a potentially dangerous approach that favors the
dramatic over the sober response."'166 The Act has also been characterized as
a "dramatic proposal that .. . can actually make matters worse by weakening
existing privacy safeguards" 167 and as one in "the recent series of attempts by
Uncle Sam to encroach on free speech and freedom of the press."1168
In sum, judges, legal scholars, legislators, and journalists are all
participants in an ongoing debate between Legalism and Decisionism. The
status of enemy combatant detentions, the meaning of the Suspension Clause,
and the future of cybersecurity have all triggered disputes regarding the rule
of law and the balance of powers in emergencies. We have seen that
Decisionist approaches have generally argued that extra-legality is necessary
and legitimate in situations of extreme emergency, and that the executive
branch is the ultimate decision-maker in emergencies. Legalists have
disagreed, positing that the "rule of law" can and should apply in
emergencies, and that all three branches of government are under a duty to
obey the Constitution.
V. THE SHARED POLITICS OF LEGALISM AND DECISIONISM
It may seem that Legalism and Decisionismn display vastly different
politics in emergencies. They often do not. Decisionists typically argue for
fewer civil rights in emergencies, 169 and Legalists argue for more.170
164 Jennifer Granick, Federal Authority Over the Internet? The Cybersecurity Act of
2009, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/cybersecurity-act.
165 Barr, supra note 163.
166 Granick, supra note 164.
167 Id.
168 Colleen Carroll Campbell, Beware Uncle Sam's Interest in New and Old Media,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2009, at A 17.
169 See supra Part II.
170 See supra Part III; see also DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW:
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Nonetheless, there is a set of three political assumptions shared by many
Legalist and Decisionist approaches: (1) emergencies trigger a necessity for
security measures that are (2) directed against public enemies and (3) should
be tailored to prevent future catastrophes. These assumptions respond to
different yet related questions arising in emergencies-questions of what,
why, and whom-that is, what the government seeks to prevent
(catastrophe); why security measures are needed (necessity); and against
whom these measures are targeted (the public enemy). These three prongs
also sum up Carl Schmitt's approach to politics.
A. Schmittian Politics
Schmitt claimed that the possibility of politics arises with the figure of
the enemy. 171 If the enemy were to disappear, the political as such would
disappear with it. In particular, the essence of politics is the existence of a
public (in contrast with private) enemy. 172 All political actions and motives,
writes Schmitt, "can be reduced to the distinction between friend and
enemy," 173 and "[t]he high points of politics are ... the moments in which
LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 60-65 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029-30 (2004) ("We urgently require new
constitutional concepts to deal with the protection of civil liberties. Otherwise, a
downward cycle threatens.... Even if the next half-century sees only four or five attacks
on the scale of September 11, this destructive cycle will prove devastating to civil
liberties by 2050."); Cole, supra note 7, at 2594-95 ("There seems to be little reason to
trust the political branches to be more attentive to constitutional rights concerns than
courts, even if courts themselves do not always perform as we might hope they would.");
Martinez, supra note 7, at 1015-16 ("All of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the
terrorism cases thus far have been focused on questions of process, as have a great many
of the lower court decisions.. .. [T]here is nothing inherent ... about terrorism that
demands only process-focused responses from courts in democratic societies.").
171 See SCmiTTrr, THEr CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 35.
172 In contrast with Schmitt's definition of "the political," consider Maurice
Blanchot's account of the May 1968 events in Europe:
An innocent presence, a 'common presence'. . ., ignoring its limits, political
because of its refusal to exclude anything and its awareness that it was, as such, the
immediate-universal, with the impossible as its only challenge, but without
determined political wills and therefore at the mercy of any sudden push by the
formal institutions against which it refused to react.... The impossibility of
recognizing an enemy, of taking into account a particular form of adversity, all that
was vivifyring ....
MAURICE BLANCHOT, Timf UNAvOWABLE ComNiTyur 31 (Pierre Joris trans., 1988).
173 SCiimrr, THEr CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 26. Schmitt defines
the political enemy as "the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is,
in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the
extreme case conflicts with him are possible." Id at 27.
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the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy."' 74 The clearest
instance of public enmity is when "[tlhe friend, enemy, and combat concepts
receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility
of physical killing." 175 The identification of the public enemy and the war
against him are necessary because without them there would be no politics
and no states.176
The public/private opposition in Schmitt's definition of the political is
significant. Schmitt claims that the enemy has always been considered a
public enemy, and that the idea of private enemy is meaningless. The enemy
emerges only in the public sphere.'177 Thus, Schmitt explains the often quoted
"Love Thy Enemies" passage (Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:27) as follows: "The
enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in the private
sphere only does it make sense to love one's enemy, [that is], one's
adversary."' 78 State-organized violence against public-political enemies is
therefore necessary and good. It is politics.
Interestingly, in 1942 George Orwell similarly reflected on the politics of
enmity:
As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill
me.
They do not feel any enmity against me as an individual, nor I against
them. They are "only doing their duty," as the saying goes. Most of them, I
have no doubt, are kind-hearted law-abiding men who would never dream
of committing murder in private life. On the other hand, if one of them
succeeds in blowing me to pieces with a well-placed bomb, he will never
14I.at 67.
15I.at 33.
176 As nicely summed by Oren Gross:
Since political groupings always stand above all other groupings (e.g., religious,
economic, cultural, and legal), and since every sphere of human conduct could
potentially rise to the level of the political-'if it is sufficiently strong to group
human beings effectively according to friend and enemy'-the exception inevitably
permeates all aspects of human existence, and deciding on it becomes the single
most important moment in every respect of human activity.
Gross, supra note 37, at 1831-32; see also SCHMrr-r, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITCAL,
supra note 43, at 53 ("The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the
sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world.").
17 SCHjMYIr, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 43, at 28 ("Hence the
enemy is not the competitor or the adversary in the general sense of the term. Neither is
he the personal, private rival whom one hates or feels antipathy for. The enemy can only
be an ensemble of grouped individuals, confronting an ensemble of the same nature,
engaged in at least a virtual struggle, that is, one that is effectively possible.").
178 Id. at 29.
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sleep any the worse for it. He is serving his country, which has the power to
absolve him from evil. 179
Orwell's insight that the "kind-hearted law-abiding" pilots probably feel no
individual enmity towards him, but will nonetheless sleep well after killing
him, precisely traces Carl Schmitt's understanding of politics and the
political enemy. 180 This Schmittian, public-enemy focused notion of politics
has indeed been, manifested throughout the twentieth century and beyond.
Jews, Communists, people of Japanese origin, and those killed by Stalin,
Mao, and Pol Pot are a few examples of groups who were understood as
public enemies of different nations in the twentieth century whose exclusion
or destruction was considered necessary for survival. 181 By grouping these
examples together I do not mean to ignore that state-organized violence
against public enemies takes different forms in different contexts. Genocides
and war-time detentions are different in harm, ideology, and techniques.
Nonetheless, the Schmittian idea that at the core of politics stands a struggle
with the political-public enemy, I think, underlies much state-inflicted
violence in the twentieth century. Today, the political-public enemy of many
western nations, including the United States, is the Islamic terrorist.
B. Necessity
Decisionists and Legalists share the political assumption that security
measures are sometime necessary for the preservation of the state, and that in
such cases civil liberties decline. Emergencies, according to both
Decisionists and Legalists, may give rise to such conditions of necessity. As
argued in Parts II to IV, the critical difference between Legalists and
Decisionists is that Decisionists argue that security measures necessitate
extra-legal executive action, whereas Legalists argue that security measures
must operate within the rule of law.
1. Decisionism
The Decisionist position is that the decline in civil liberties in times of
national security emergencies is the inevitable consequence of a calculated
shift in the balance between security and liberty. Security trumps liberty in
179 George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, in
WHYIwWiTE 11, 11 (2004).
180 See also HANNAH ARENDT, EicHmANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALrrY OF EVIL 195-205 (1989) (Eichrnann distinguishes specific Jewish people that
he liked and respected from his willingness to obey the laws of his nation that view the
Jew as a public enemy).
181 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
2010] 733
734 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
emergencies. Thus, Decisionists have claimed that constitutional protections
during emergencies should be "relaxed," and that "executive ... misuse of
the power for political gain"~ is "justified by the national security benefits." 82
The main argument is that the "point of balance" between national security
and civil liberties shifts towards security in times of emergency.
In Not a Suicide Pact, Richard Posner quotes Justice Jackson's famous
words that "[tlhe choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty
with order and anarchy without either."' 83 Posner argues that "the weight of
concerns for public safety increases relative to that of liberty concerns, and
civil liberties are narrowed."1184 In contrast, "[iln safer times, the balance
shifts the other way and civil liberties are broadened." 85 This, according to
Posner, is the inevitable result of lawmakers' aspiration for a certain point in
a formula, "at which a slight expansion in the scope of the right would
subtract more from public safety than it would add to personal liberty and a
slight contraction would subtract more from personal liberty than it would
add to public safety."1186
Similarly, John Yoo has argued that the cost of protecting civil liberties
in emergencies is a decline in security, and "[e]xcessive worry about civil
liberties prevents us from thinking more aggressively about electronic
surveillance." 187 Yoo further argues that for two additional reasons civil
liberties should decline in times of emergency. First, "[legitimate political
activities and speech by American citizens are not being suppressed."'188
Second, there is nothing new about these incursions on human rights, for
"civil liberties throughout our history have expanded in peacetime and
contracted during emergencies. During the Civil War, the two world wars,
and the Cold War, Congress and the President restricted civil liberties, and
courts deferred; during peacetime, civil liberties expanded." 189
Courts tend to accept and reiterate such arguments from necessity. 190 As
Eugene Kontorovich has argued, "[tlhe Court tends to uphold arguably
unconstitutional detentions during national security emergencies, deferring to
182 POSNER & VERMEULE, su~pra note 1, at 16.
183 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("There is a danger that if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little
practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional bill of rights into a suicide pact.").
184 POSNER, supra note 83, at 9.
186 Id. at 3 1.
1 8 7 JOHN~ Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 96 (2006).
190 POSNER, supra note 83, at 32; Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1143.
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the Executive's affirmations of the necessity of the detentions." 91
Christopher Kutz has also argued with regard to the "torture memo"' 92 that
"[t]he override of detainee rights against torture has been justified on grounds
of 'necessity,' i.e., that the welfare cost of observing the right would be too
great for the nation rationally to bear."' 93
2. Legalism
The Obama Administration has so far reasoned from necessity in a
manner hardly distinguishable from that of the former Bush Administration.
Although the commitment to legality and the rule of law is frequently
underscored by the President and government officials, the Administration
has pursued a similar politics of necessity, as evident in the following two
examples.
a. The Prison at Guantanamo Bay
The closing of the military prison at Guantanamo was announced within
the first few months of the new Administration.'19 4 As discussed in Part IV,
the Bush Administration's practice of detaining "enemy combatants" at
Guantanamo raised serious issues of legality. Legalist commentators, as well
as the Boumediene majority, criticized the Administration for intentionally
setting up a legal "black hole" outside the scope of U.S. law and its
protections.'195 It came as no surprise then that the new Administration would
191 Kontorovich, supra note 93, at 781-82 ("During the Civil War, President Lincoln
suspended habeas corpus, allowing the Secretary of War to detain 13,000 Northern
civilians, most of them political opponents of the war. The arrests were either made
without charges or were for vaguely defined offenses created by executive decrees.
During World War 11, approximately 120,000 Japanese were interned in camps on the
basis of military orders.").
192 Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation to Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf (widely known as the "torture
memo").
19 Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REX'.
235, 236 (2007). Kutz concludes that "[bjy removing politics from the formal legal
restraints that legitimate it, the theory of extralegal authority transforms necessity into a
device for overriding all rights in the name of the security of a nation whose political
identity has perforce been lost." Id. at 266.
19 Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down
Guantinamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at Al.
195 See supra Part IV.
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prioritize the eradication of this notorious, internationally condemned "black
hole."
The dramatic announcement to the press about the closing of the base
was followed by a noteworthy justification. Though one may have expected
explicit language of human dignity, liberty, or fairness, the main reason to
close Guantanamo was, according to a senior official in the Obama
administration, "protecting our national security, respecting the Geneva
Conventions and the rule of law, and respecting the existing institutions of
justice in this country."' 96 That is, the base was closed primarily to protect
the American people and the rule of law. It is important to see here that at
least in the universe of this statement, the vulnerable party is not the prisoner
at Guantanamo but the American people and the rule of law.
A few months later, the Administration revealed a plan to create a special
facility inside the United States where Guantanamo inmates would be
detained, tried, and imprisoned.' 97 The proposal involved a facility that
would include a detention center for terror suspects, courtrooms for criminal
trials, and military commissions. President Obama explained that he would
move to "construct a legitimate legal framework to justify the ongoing
detention of dangerous terrorism suspects who could not be tried or
released." 198 Obama added that "military commissions, which allow
defendants fewer rights, would be the 'appropriate venue' for the trials of at
least some detainees,"' 99 and that Guantanamo detainees who are understood
to be posing a national security threat but cannot be prosecuted, either for
lack of evidence or because evidence is tainted, should indeed be subject to
"prolonged detention" with oversight by the courts and Congress.200
However, Republican pressure in Congress led to the approval of a non-
binding recommendation banning the transfer of the detainees inside the
United States. 201 Later in 2009, the House voted to allow detainees being
'96 Nomination Hearing for Director of Intelligence before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 111 th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Dennis C. Blair, nominee, Director of
National Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/09O122/blair.pdf.
197 Bobby Ghosh, New Gitmo Proposal Draws Wide Range of Critics, TIME (Aug.
4, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 19 14444,00.html.
198 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Would Move Some Detainees to US., N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2009, at Al.
19 Id.
200 Id.
201 Charlie Savage, US. Said to Pick Illinois Prison to House Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at A26. Republicans have also proposed legislation to defend the
Midwest from this pending threat. See Keep Terrorists Out of the Midwest Act,
H.R. 4120, 111 th Cong. (1 st Sess. 20 10); see also Keep Terrorists Out of America Act,
H.R. 2294, 111 th Cong. (I1st Sess. 20 10).
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held at Guantanamo to be transferred to the United States, but only to stand
trial.202
As of today, the Guantanamo prison facility is still open. In January
2010, an Administration official announced that the Administration has
decided to continue to imprison, without trials, nearly fifty detainees at
Guantanamo "because a high-level task force has concluded that they are too
difficult to prosecute but too dangerous to release." 203 in sum, the new
Administration has not pulled away from its predecessor's politics of
necessity, the attendant practices of indefinite detentions, and trials by
military commissions with substantially fewer rights. The main difference is
that now the detainees are under the oversight of courts and Congress, and
within the "rule of law."
b. Release of Prisoner Abuse Photographs
Another example of the Legalist politics of necessity implemented by the
Obama Administration involves its refusal to release photographs of prisoner
abuse by U.S. troops. The government appealed a 2008 decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled that the government
must release the photos to comply with an American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit.204 In May of 2009,
government lawyers objected to a court-ordered release of images revealing
alleged abuse of detainees "because the release could affect the safety of U.S.
troops."205 President Obama explained that "the most direct consequence of
releasing them would be to fturther inflame anti-American opinion, and to put
our troops in greater danger."206 Defense Secretary Gates added that "our
commanders ... have expressed very serious reservations about this...
[suggesting] that the release of these photographs will cost American
lives." 207 After the Obama administration filed its appeal with the Supreme
Court, Congress passed the Protected National Security Documents Act of
202 David Stout, House Backs Detainee Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at
A17.
203 Charlie Savage, Detainees Will Still Be Held, But Not Tried, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A14 ("[T]he administration has decided that nearly 40 other
detainees should be prosecuted for terrorism or related war crimes. And the remaining
prisoners, about 110 men, should be repatriated or transferred to other countries for
possible release ... )
204 ACLU v. Dep't of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded
by 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
205 Ed Homick, Obama Reverses Course on Alleged Prison Abuse Photos, CNN
(May 13, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/1 2/Prisoner.photos/index.html.
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2009.208 The Act permits the administration to exempt from the FOJA
photographs "taken during the period beginning on September 11, 2001,
through January 22, 2009, . . . if the Secretary of Defense determines that
disclosure of that photograph would endanger citizens of the United States,
members of the United States Armed Forces, or employees of the United
States Government deployed outside the United States." 209 On November 30,
2009, in light of the intervening Act, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the Second Circuit's decision ordering the release of the photos.210
The logic here is similar to the proposal to relocate Guantanamo inside
the United States. The President does not claim here that transparency and
public scrutiny of government are not important democratic practices and
values. The President agrees that they are. This was in fact part of his agenda
both during the presidential campaign and since the elcio.1 The point is
that transparency is desirable unless it may "inflame anti-American opinion"
and "put our troops in greater danger." 212 Necessity trumps the democratic
values that would otherwise demand the publication of these abuse photos.213
Moreover, the trajectory of the case reflects the Legalist preference for
folding the exception into the law through recourse to congressional action to
legalize the President's security-driven decision-making.
C. Enmity
As discussed above, Schmitt claimed that politics must involve war
against a public enemy. The classification that currently captures this
Schmittian insight is that of the "enemy combatant." Enemy combatants are
not considered Prisoners of War (POWs) and are therefore not entitled to the
general legal protections of the laws of war. The difference between "enemy
combatants" and "lawful combatants" is that whereas both are subject to
capture and detention as POWs by opposing forces, "enemy combatants" are
also "subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful." 214 The "enemy combatant" status places
208 Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 565.
209 Id.
2 10 Dep't of Def. v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777, 777 (2009).
211 Id
212 Id.
213 319 Freedom of Information Act lawsuits were filed during Barack Obama's first
year as president, as opposed to 298 and 278 per year in the last two years of the Bush
Administration. Carol D. Leonnig, Over 300 Public-Records Lawsuits Filed in Obama 's
First Year, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A3.
214 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
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non-citizens suspected of Islamic terrorism out of the reach of ordinary laws,
and in the hands of military tribunals.215
1. Decisionism
The term "enemy combatant" and its usage significantly changed and
broadened in the war on terror that followed the events of September 11,
2001. In 1942, the Court in Ex Parte Quirin defined "enemy combatant" as
follows:
The spy who secretly and without uniform. passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and
communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform
comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to
be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals.216
The Quirin definition of "enemy combatant" reflects an assumption that
good war takes place between recognizable armies of legitimate nation-
states. What one wears and how one presents oneself are key parts of how the
Quirin Court understands the "enemy combatant" status in 1942. By acting
without a uniform, one is disguising oneself as a friend when one is in fact an
enemy. The main idea then was that those who can be mistaken for friends
but are in fact enemies are deemed "offenders against the law of war," and
can consequently be tried and punished by military tribunals for these acts of
215 See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLum. L. REv. 1823, 1827
(2009) ("[Fjrom the traditional perspective of Anglo-American law, . .. a preliminary
inquiry about who is within the protection of the law is essential-not to justify lawless
government action, but precisely to hold off claims of lawless power and to preserve
legal rights.").
2 16 Ex Parte Quinin, 317 U.S. at '31 ("[Tlhe law of war draws a distinction between
the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between
those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture
and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The
spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of
war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an
enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose
of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents
who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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transgression. So, for the Quirin Court in 1942, the term "enemy combatant"
marked a transgressive act of war (bad violence), as opposed to a "normal"
act of war (good violence).
In contrast, in the current war on terror there is no designated "normal"
act of war for the public enemy. There is no legitimate Taliban or al Qaeda
army that can operate within ordinary laws of war. All acts of war performed
by such organizations are outside the laws of war.2 17 And all members of
such organizations are classified as "enemy combatants. "2 1 8 On November
13, 2001, then-President Bush issued an order entitled "Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism."219 An "enemy combatant" was consequently defined by the Bush
Administration as follows:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces.220
As some commentators have noted, this definition is significantly broader
than the one set forth by the Court in Quirin. Now any supporter of an
organization designated as "terrorist" is within the scope of the definition
regardless of whether the person actually committed any acts of war.2 21 More
importantly, the new definition is different in that the enemy is marked by
identification with a specific cause or politics (Islamic, anti-Western), rather
than by transgressing a general set of norms of war.
In sum, during the Bush era the refraining of the special category of
''enemy combatant'' enabled a regime of indefinite detentions and
interrogations without trial of the public enemy in the war on terror.
218 lIn this context it is interesting that the war is called "war on terror," terror being
more of an abstract act than a clear enemy to which one can point.
219 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
220 Memorandum from the Deputy Sec'y of Def. on Implementation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatant Detained at U.S. Naval Base,
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba to Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts (July 14, 2006), at 1, available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2OO6/d206O8O9CSRTProcedures.pdf.
221 Id at 3.
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2. Legalism
"As we work towards developing a new policy to govern detainees, it is
essential that we operate in a manner that strengthens our national
security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by law.- "222
- US. Attorney General Eric Holder 2009
In January 2009, the Bush Administration was replaced by the Obama
Administration. In March 2009, the Department of Justice indicated that the
United States would no longer use the term "enemy combatants" to
characterize detained al Qaeda or Taliban members or supporters. The
government nonetheless maintained that it had the right to detain persons
who provided substantial support for al Qaeda and the Taliban without
criminal charges, based on the Congressional Authorization for the Use of
Military Force. (AUMF), 223 as informed by the laws of war.224 The
government explained that its new standard "relies on the international laws
of war to inform the scope of the president's authority under this statute [the
AUMF], and makes clear that the government does not claim authority to
hold persons based on insignificant or insubstantial support of al Qaeda or
the Taliban. "225
The government dropped the previous Administration's position that the
power to detain independently flowed from the President's constitutional
powers as commander-in-chief.226 Instead, it linked its new policy to legal
principles governed by the rule of law:
The laws of war have evolved primarily in the context of international
armed conflicts between the armed forces of nation states. This body of law,
however, is less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of
222 Del Quentin Wilber & Peter Finn, US. Retires 'Enemy Combatant,' Keeps
Broad Right to Detain, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at A6.
223 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (200 1).
224 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Withdraws "Enemy
Combatant" Definition for Guantanamo Detainees, No. 09-232 (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.htm ("The definition does not rely
on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief independent of Congress's specific
authorization. It draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority
conferred by Congress. It provides that individuals who supported al Qaeda or the
Taliban are detainable only if the support was substantial. And it does not employ the
phrase 'enemy combatant. " (emphasis added)).
225 Id
226 John R. Crook, United States Abandons Detention Based on Designation as
Enemy Combatant But Maintains Right to Detain Persons Giving Substantial Support to
Terrorism, 103 Am. J. INT'L L. 351, 35 1-52 (2009).
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armed conflict against armed groups such as al-Qaida and the Taliban.
Principles derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority
Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict. 22 7
Laws of war, according to the above, are not well equipped to deal with this
"6novel type" of conflict. Nonetheless, these principles "must inform" the
interpretation of AUMF. And so goes the government's interpretation of
AUMF:
Accordingly, under the AUMF, the President has authority to detain persons
who he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored
those responsible for the September 11 attacks. The President also has the
authority under the AUMF to detain in this armed conflict those persons
whose relationship to al-Qaida or the Taliban would, in appropriately
analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render
them detainable. . . . The President also has the authority to detain persons
who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent
act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed
forces. 228
Whereas the former Administration viewed the President's powers as
part of the war powers as commander-in-chief, the current Administration
locates these powers in congressional authorization. By dropping the "enemy
combatant" classification, alluding to statutory authority, and invoking vague
and mostly inapplicable principles of international law, the current
Administration has managed to accomplish the primary goal of current
Legalism: to fold the exception back into the realm of law. But it has not
altered the previous Administration's politics of enmity. Thus, for those
227 Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.usdoj .gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
228 Id. at 1-2 ("It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify',
in the abstract, the precise nature and degree of 'substantial support,' or the precise
characteristics of 'associated forces,' that are or would be sufficient to bring persons and
organizations within the foregoing framework. ... [T]he particular facts and
circumstances justifying detention will vary from case to case, and may require the
identification and analysis of various analogues from traditional international armed
conflicts. Accordingly, the contours of the 'substantial support' and 'associated forces'
bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete facts
in individual cases.").
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towards whom state violence is directed, nothing much seems to have
changed.229
D. Catastrophe
The third shared characteristic of Decisionist and Legalist politics is their
perception of time and history. The task of the state and its laws, according to
current U.S. Decisionism and Legalism, is to prevent future catastrophes.
Catastrophe, in this view, is conceptualized as an event that takes place not in
the present but in the future. The catastrophe. is rarely viewed as a current
harm inflicted by the state, the government, the army, or the law. The
catastrophe is instead what society seeks to prevent from occur-ring in the
future.
1. Decisionism
The basic Decisionist. assumption is that catastrophes are very likely to
occur in the future if security measures pursued by the executive branch are
restricted by Congress or courts. Scalia's dissenting opinion in Boumediene
provides a vivid example of this perception of catastrophe:
* America is at war with radical Islamists.... On September 11, 2001, the
enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the Twin Towers
in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., and 40 in
Pennsylvania. It has threatened further attacks against our homeland; one
need only walk about buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a
plane anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a serious one...
The game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.230
In Scalia's account here, the events of September 11I are only part of a chain
of events that makes up America's "war with radical Islamists." The
catastrophe is pending in the future, in which "almost certainly" more
Americans will be killed. Thus, as the concluding lines of Scalia's dissent
warn, "[t]he Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today."2 3 '
A similar notion of catastrophe also underlies Vermeule and Posner's
Decisionist proposition that emergencies "lie on a continuum" at the extreme
end of which are "policies adopted in times of full-blown crisis, when it
might be reasonable to believe that serious harms threaten the nation, as in
229 Sealso Martinez, supra note 7, at 10 15.
230 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827-28 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 850.
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the immediate aftermaths of Pearl Harbor or 9/11.1"232 In such instances,
"[tlime is of the essence, the stakes of blocking necessary government action
are possibly catastrophic, and uncertainty reigns."233 Thus, although "[w]ith
the benefit of hindsight, the early [governmental] reactions [to an emergency]
might seem inexplicable except as a result of panic ... this does not do
justice to the problem that the government faces at the time of emergency,
when uncertainty is great and the consequence of error may be
catastrophic." 234 interestingly, in this Decisionist articulation, even "times of
fuill-blown crisis" such as September 11 and Pearl Harbor are not themselves
deemed catastrophic. They are only alarming signs of greater pending
catastrophes.
Fear as a legitimate motivation for government action is one
consequence of this Decisionist notion of catastrophe. In response to the
"view that panicked government officials overreact to an emergency and
unnecessarily curtail civil liberties," Posner and Vermeule offer what they
call a "more constructive theory of the role of fear."1235 They argue that:
Before the emergency, governiment officials are complacent. They do not
think clearly or vigorously about the potential threats faced by the nation.
After the terrorist attack or military intervention, their complacency is
replaced by fear. Fear stimulates them to action. Action may be based on
good decisions or bad: fear might cause officials to exaggerate future
threats, but it also might arouse them to threats that they would otherwise
not perceive. It is impossible to say in the abstract whether decisions and
actions provoked by fear are likely to be better than decisions and actions
made in a state of calm. But our limited point is that there is no reason to
think that the fear-inspired decisions are likely to be worse.236
Fear, according to Posner and Vermneule, is not necessarily a bad trigger for
action. It arouses officials to the future possibility of catastrophe. Thus, while
the writers concede that fear might have the negative impact of exaggerating
future threats, it may also lead officials to save the nation from catastrophes
they may not have foreseen if it was not for the fear.
The point here is not that the Decisionists are wrong in their predictions
about the future (that we cannot know), but that the Decisionists operate
under a political assumption that is haunted by an idea of catastrophe that is
yet to come.237 We cannot know whether an event such as 9/11 is indeed a
232 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 42.
233 Id
24I.at 86.
235 Id. at 64.
236Id. (emphasis added).
237 See WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA 65-66 (John
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sign of future catastrophes, the culm-ination of past catastrophes, or just a
present isolated catastrophe. And yet it is only within a particular perspective
of history that the future is haunted by catastrophe waiting to occur. As it
happens, this view is currently shared by Legalism and Decisionism.
2. Legalism
Legalist positions frequently share the Decisionist anticipation of future
catastrophes. But whereas Decisionists have utilized this notion of
catastrophe to argue for greater executive power, Legalists have often
concentrated their efforts on bringing governmental responses to future
catastrophes within the rule of law. As Justice Kennedy wrote in
Boumediene:
The real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely
soon to abate. The ways to disrupt our life and laws are so many and
unforeseen that the Court should not attempt even some general catalogue
of crises that might occur. Certain principles are apparent, however.
Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the definition
and reach of the law's writs, including habeas corpus. The cases and our
tradition reflect this precept.238
In other words, while the future will likely bring a range of many real and as
yet unforeseen catastrophes, the proper response to this reality is through
law. Another example of this Legalist 'faith in law's governance of future
catastrophes is found in Bruce Ackerman's Emergency Constitution.
Ackerman predicts:
Terrorist attacks will be a recurring part of our future. The balance of
technology has shifted, making it possible for a small band of zealots to
wreak devastation where we least expect it-not on a plane next time, but
with poison gas in the subway or a biotoxin in the water supply. The attack
of September 11I is the prototype for many events that will litter the twenty-
first century. We should be looking at it in a diagnostic spirit: What can we
learn that will permit us to respond more intelligently the next time
around?2 39
Osbourne trans., 1998) ("The ruler is designated from the outset as the holder of
dictatorial power if war, revolt, or other catastrophes should lead to a state of
emergency. This is typical of the Counter-Reformation ... [flor as an antithesis to the
historical ideal of restoration it is haunted by the idea of catastrophe. And it is in response
to this antithesis that the theory of the state of emergency is devised.").
238 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008).
239 Ackerman, supra note 170, at 1029.
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This depiction of a twenty-first century littered with zealot attacks on our
subway and water portrays the attacks of 9/11 not as a stand-alone event, but
as a "prototype" of the much greater catastrophes that will 'follow. The
problem, according to Ackerman, is that when terrorism strikes, "a
downward cycle threatens: [a]fter each successful attack, politicians will
come up with repressive laws and promise greater security--only to find that
a different terrorist band manages to strike a few years later."240 in other
words, this is a kind of anti-terrorism whack-a-mole. Thus:
To avoid a repeated cycle of repression, defenders of freedom must consider
a more hard-headed doctrine--one that allows short-term emergency
measures but draws the line against permanent restrictions. . . . [T]he self-
conscious design of an emergency regime may well be the best available
defense against a panic-driven cycle of permanent destruction.241
Ackerman's thoughtful attempt to reconcile the rule of law with the need for
temporary emergency measures captures the prevalent mode of many current
versions of Legalism. We are undoubtedly expecting catastrophe, but we
must respond to it through the rule of law.2 42
To conclude, current forms of U.S. Decisionism and Legalism often
share the three basic tenets of Carl Schmitt's political doctrine: (1)
emergencies create the necessity for security measures (2) that are directed
against public enemies (3) in order to prevent greater catastrophes in the
future.
VI. TOWARDS A HUMANIST DECISIONISM
The first step in articulating an alternative to Legalism and Decisionism
is the recognition that politics and jurisprudence are sometimes
240 Id. (citation omitted).
241 Id at 1030.
242 Ackerman proposes that only an actual terrorist attack should trigger "the
emergency constitution." Unlike a "clear and present danger" standard, which can be
manipulated by the President and the executive branch, a "major terrorist attack is an
indisputable reality, beyond the capacity of politicians to manipulate," and "that's why it
serves as the best trigger for an emergency regime." Id. at 1060. Ackerman suggests that
a legal formula should be devised to restrict this triggering event. His suggested formula
states, "State of emergency may be proclaimed by the Executive in response to a terrorist
attack that kills large numbers of innocent civilians in a way that threatens the recurrence
of more large-scale attacks. The declaration lapses within seven days unless approved by
a majority of the legislature." Id. For various criticisms of Ackerman's proposal, see, e.g.,
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 162-68; Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 20 15-17;
Laurence Tribe, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1829 (2004).
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distinguishable. In our case, the disaggregation of politics and jurisprudence
uncovers some basic flaws in Legalism and Decisionism.
The main flaw of current Decisionism is revealed once jurisprudence is
set aside from politics; this is because Decisionists have quite wisely
combined the two into a causal argument in the form of "if Jurisprudence
then Politics." The Decisionist "if... then . . ." claim simply means that if
law cannot predict all possible situations that arise in emergencies, then civil
liberties must decline in emergencies, public enemies must be fought, and
catastrophes are pending. This argument, which legitimizes state violence in
times of emergency, is substantially weakened if one sees that the question of
the law "running out" and the questions of necessity, enmity, and catastrophe
are separate. Lawlessness need not coincide with anti-humanist politics.
Decisionist jurisprudence need not be linked to a politics of necessity,
enmity, and catastrophe.
The Decisionist accepts that sometimes norms will contradict one
another, and sometimes the law will "run out."12 43 But decision-making based
on intuition does not have to locate enmity at the core of politics. The
decision-maker might. prefer a politics of hospitality and friendship. For
example, Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain have argued that clemency should
be understood as "legally sanctioned illegality," which in fact bears structural
similarity to executive emergency powers.244 The decision to pardon a
convicted criminal, though legally sanctioned (in the sense. of legally
approved), is a type of decision that is not governed by a set of legal norms,
and is thus a legally sanctioned form of illegality. This is a type of
Decisionism that is driven by forgiveness rather than by fear or enmity.
On the Legalist end, the disaggregation of jurisprudence from politics
underscores that many current forms of Legalism in the United States have
prioritized jurisprudence over politics. Legalist politics, as we have seen, are
243 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1163 ("What makes the thinker a decisionist is not that
he has a global or ontological critique of justificatory closure, hut that, after coming upon
a situation of choice where governing norms contradict one another or 'run out,' he
refuses the enterprise of either repairing the discourse or replacing it with a new discourse
that will be more determinate. If the decisionist is a responsible actor, and time has run
out at the same time 'the law' has, then she accepts that she will just have to 'do it' on the
basis of intuition rather than with a 'warrant."' (emphasis added)).
244 Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan,
Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1307, 1314
(2004) ("[A] jurisprudence of emergency draws attention to a more fundamental question
that subtends such periodic crises: How does a system of rules understand and
acconmmodate the exercise of a power that is by its very nature unbound by rules? This is
also the question that animates our analysis of the power to pardon. Executive clemency,
of course, does not generally deal in terms of imminent peril or collapse; its usual idiom
is one of mercy and not danger. And yet, for us, the two situations are not entirely
dissimilar, as they both highlight the complex relations of rules and exceptions.").
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often aligned with Decisionist politics. Many Legalist approaches have
acceded to the Decisionist politics of necessity, enmity, and catastrophe, the
main difference being that Legalists have attempted to engage in these
politics from within the rule of law rather than through a language of
exceptionalism.
From a freedom-enhancing perspective, there is much to gain by setting
aside the jurisprudential questions of the law and the exception. David
Dyzenhaus has written that "[t]o answer [the Decisionist] challenge one
needs to show that there is a substantive conception of the rule of law that is
appropriate at all times."245 I disagree. The Schmittian challenge should not
be reduced to its narrow jurisprudential claims about exceptionalism. It
should not be reduced to whether or not courts and legislatures can properly
review or enact emergency measures. Schmitt's difficult and very timely
challenge is the linking of jurisprudential claims about emergencies to the
political claims about necessity, enmity, and catastrophe. This link must be
undone.
A. Defining Humanist Decisionism
One of the aims of this Article is to unlink Decisionist jurisprudence
from some of its current political claims by offering another type of
Decisionism: Humanist Decisionism. This approach accepts some key
Decisionist insights about jurisprudence but is at the same time Humanist in
politics.
1. A Politics ofHospitality and Friendship
The currently prevailing Schmittian assumption that politics must stem
from enmity, necessity, and catastrophe has been heavily criticized by a
number of twentieth century thinkers who have instead conceptualized
politics in terms of hospitality and friendship. 246
A politics of hospitality and friendship contests the idea that "[w]ar is a
mere continuation of politics by other means."247 At the end of the eighteenth
245 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7, at 2037.
2 4 6 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS (2009); WALTER
BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA (2003); JACQUES DERRIDA, ADIEU:
To EMMANUEL LEVINAS (1999) [hereinafter DERRIDA, ADIEU]; JACQUES DERRIDA,
POLITICS OF FRIENDSHP (1994); MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION
(2007); Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (1995); Giorgio
Agamben, States of Emergency, http://www.generation-
online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm.
247 1 CARL VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR 23 (J.J. Graham trans., 1911).
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century, in an essay called Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant disputed the
then- and now-held perception that armies are necessary for the peaceful
existence of humanity.2 48 Kant instead called for conditions of "universal
hospitality." 249 To adapt Kant's point, hospitality suggests the image not of a
standing army-an army at the ready-but of a standing host, one at the
ready in welcoming in the guest, the stranger, the passer-by.
.Later thinkers, such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, have
offered possible meanings of hospitality. Hospitality, as Derrida. explains, "is
not simply some region of ethics, let alone .. . the name of a problem in law
or politics: it is ethicity itself, the whole and the principle of ethics."250
Hospitality demands an extreme type of responsibility, "[riesponsibility
without concerns for reciprocity: I have to be responsible for the Other
without concerning myself about the Other's responsibility toward me."251
Hospitality involves "intentionality, consciousness of... attention to speech,
welcome of the face."252 It is a declaration of peace,253 and it assumes a
relation of deference to the other.254 In the realm of political theory, Hannah
Arendt has articulated a concept of the political that, in opposition to
Schmitt, is not defined by enmity and violence but by plurality, freedom, and
friendship of equals. 255
248 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 5 (Lewis White Beck ed., 1957)
("' Standing Armies Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished'- For they incessantly menace
other states by their readiness to appear at all times prepared for war; they incite them to
compete with each other in the number of armed men, and there is no limit to this. For
this reason, the cost of peace finally becomes more oppressive than that of a short war,
and consequently a standing army is itself a cause of offensive war waged in order to
relieve the state of this burden. Add to this that to pay men to kill or to be killed seems to
entail using them as mere machines and tools in the hand of another (the state), and this is
hardly compatible with the rights of mankind in our own person.").
2.9I.at 20.
250 DERRIDA, ADIEU, supra note 246, at 50. Derrida further distinguishes Levinas's
understanding of hospitality from Kant's. Id. at 87-88 (Kant's "universal hospitality is
here only juridical and political; it grants only the right of temporary soj ourn and the right
of residence; it concerns only the citizens of States; and, in spite of its institutional
character, it is founded on a natural right, the common possession of the round and finite
surface of the earth across which man cannot spread ad infinitumn ... Levinas always
prefers .. . peace now ... Whereas for Kant the institution of an eternal peace, of a
cosmopolitical law, and of universal hospitality, retains a trace of natural hostility,
whether present or threatening, real or virtual, for Levinas the contrary would be so: war
itself retains the testimonial trace of a pacific welcoming of the face.").
251 Id. at 148 n. 111 (translating and citing Levinas).
212 Id. at 46.
211Id. at 47.
214 Id. at 46.
255 See generally ARENDT, supra note 246; see also David W. Bates, Enemies and
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It is difficult to fully translate the ethical principles of friendship and
hospitality into current legal and political theories. Friendship and hospitality
appear utopian, nalfve, unrealistic, certainly non-Schniittian, and generally
inadequate as political assumptions. Nonetheless, I argue that if we were to at
least consider letting these principles inform the politics of current decision-
making, we might begin a shift away from our current Schmittian politics. 2 56
We could start by considering a politics of friendship and hospitality
alongside (if not instead of) Schmittian politics of enmity.
At the very least, friendship and hospitality at the level of nations must
involve responsibility towards non-violent individuals who are harmed by
hostile actions undertaken by Western governments in the name of the
national security of their own citizens. This may be viewed as a non-
discrimination principle at the multi-national level. A politics of friendship
and hospitality treats equally the lives of all innocent people regardless of
national origins or geographical boundaries. Thus, in the context of the
current "war on terror," a politics of friendship and hospitality demands
responsibility toward all the innocent civilian victims of the violent "war on
terror" declared by the United States. I will later offer applications of this
point.
2. Decisionist Jurisprudence
As we have seen, what makes one a Decisionist is that "after coming
upon a situation of choice where governing norms contradict one another or
'run out,' he refuses the enterprise of either repairing the discourse or
replacing it with a new discourse that will be more determinate." 257 When
legal norms cannot provide meaningful guidance to a legal actor, the
Decisionist will not insist that they can.
The crux of Decisionism is the understanding that lawmakers at various
levels must act in multiple situations "on the basis of intuition rather than
with a 'warrant."' 258 And this may be difficult at times because "making
decisions about what legal rule we want to use . . . -or even which political
direction to go in-is hard."12 59 It is hard because "[w]e might have to decide
Friends. Arendt on the Imperial Republic at War, in HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 36,
112, 115 (2010).
2 5 6 See also NMR EIsiKovrrs, SYMPATHiziNG wImTH E ENEMY: RECONCILIATION,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEGOTIATION 1 (2009) (arguing that the path to meaningful peace
between historically hostile groups involves "the inculcation of sympathetic attitudes...
the ability to imaginatively switch places with others and view the world from their
perspective").
257 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1163.
2 58 Id.
259 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 185 (2006).
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without knowing that our understanding of the situation is right, without
knowing how our decision will play out."126 0 In fact, "there is no decision that
we could possibly make that will not hurt vast numbers of real, actual people,
possibly the very people on whose behalf we think we are acting."26'
Derrida brings ethics into our understanding of Humanist Decisionism.
"Ethics," Derrida writes, "enjoins a politics and a law.".262 "Enjoins" here
means not the legalistic "prohibits," but the salutary "prescribes." Derrida
then claims that "this dependence [of politics and law on ethics] and the
direction of this conditional derivation are as irreversible as they are
unconditional."263 This relationship is unconditional in the sense that law and
politics must always strive to be ethical and should at no point suspend ethics
to achieve other goals. And the relationship is irreversible-and this is the
important Decisionist insight-in that law and politics do not inform ethics.
This is because, for Derrida, ethics is not a universal principle; it can never
by codified or broken down into a set of pre-determined rules. Hospitality
and friendship cannot generate a "to do" list for legal actors. Thus Derrida
continues: "But the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains
undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all
presentation, all concepts, all possible intuition, in a singular way, in the
speech and the responsibility taken by each person in each situation, and on
the basis of an analysis that is each time unique ..... 2 6 4
There are multiple decision-makers and actors in emergencies-the
President, executive officers, judges, legislators, the military, the media, and
ordinary citizens-and they all will inevitably have to decide and act at times
with no clear legal guidance. They are nonetheless under ethical constraints
that exceed law and legality. And while this is true at all times and in all
areas of law, not only in emergencies, emergencies are extreme situations
where the limits of legal norms (as opposed to ethical norms) become
apparent.
Take for example the decision-making process around 8 a.m. on the
morning of September 11, 200 1. It has just been discovered that an unknown
number of planes have been hijacked and are up in the air somewhere above
U.S. soil. It is unclear where the planes are headed or what the hijacking is
about. Unfortunately, it is clear to any decision-maker that all possible
decisions taken in this dramatic situation would inevitably end the lives of
innocents. The gist of the Decisionist approach here is the recognition that
intuition-based decisions, not predetermined norms, will govern such
20I.at 185-86.
261 Id
262 DERRIDA, ADIEU, supra note 246, at 115.
263 Id (emphasis added).
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situations. The Humanist Decisionist will nonetheless insist that actors in
these situations must be responsible and ethical agents, and that a
combination of responsible politics and competence (rather than any legal
norm) will ultimately determine the outcome of the event.
To clarify, a politics of hospitality does not mean that decision-makers
must sit passively in times of hostile attacks. In a situation when lives need to
be saved and harms can be mitigated, violence may be necessary. Hospitality
and friendship do not mean neglecting the lives of innocent victims of
violence. It means that the concern, care, and anxiety that are rightfully
extended to the victims of the attacks who happen to be U.S. citizens should
also be extended to victims of the counter-attacks inflicted by the U.S who
happen not to be U.S. citizens.
Finally, the Humanist Decisionist realizes that when decision-making
during a hostile attack-and (perhaps more importantly) when the actual
attack has ended-are guided by a politics of necessity, enmity, and
catastrophe, it does not matter much whether the decisions technically fall
within the "rule of law" or within the exception. What matters more is the
politics that drive and guide the decision-maker. For example, for Humanist
Decisionism it does not matter much whether Guantanamo detentions are
justified as a necessary black hole (as they were by the Bush administration),
or folded into the rule of law through statutory interpretation (as they were by
the Obama administration). To the Humanist Decisionist, what matters most
is that a politics of hospitality and friendship can offer a desirable alternative
or at least additional considerations in the decision-making process involving
national security emergencies.
B. Normative Implications
Humanist Decisionism contests the prevailing political assumptions of
enmity, necessity, and catastrophe. Among many of its possible implications,
here I focus on three. First, Humanist Decisionism challenges the politics of
enmity by arguing that the legal distinction between the public and the
private enemy should be eliminated. Second, it challenges the politics of
necessity and catastrophe by adopting a posture of skepticism regarding the'
very existence of an emergency. Finally, Humanist Decisionism prescribes
the undertaking of measures of friendship and hospitality even at times when
simultaneous security measures are deemed necessary.
1. Undoing the Legal Distinction Between
Public and Private Enemies
The first normative implication of Humanist Decisionism is that we need
to rethink the distinction between public and private enemies. As we have
752 Vol. 71:4
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seen, by the fourth decade of the twentieth century, Schmitt and Orwell, from
very different perspectives, both identified the figure of the public enemy as
the foundational brick of modern politics. Interestingly, as Philip Hamburger
recently observed, this distinction between public and private enemies in
legal thought dates back at least to the eighteenth century. Emerich de Vattel,
one of the founders of international law, distinguished a private enemy from
a public enemy, the former being "one who seeks to hurt us, and takes
pleasure in the evil that befalls us," and the latter "forms claims against
us, or rejects ours, and maintains his real or pretended rights by force of
arms."6
Humanist Decisionism resists the idea that public enemies deserve
special legal treatment. A Humanist Decisionist approach questions the legal
distinction between these two types of enmity and suggests that terrorism
should be treated just like any other violent crime, under domestic criminal
law. Indeed, this was traditionally the practice of the United States
government. 266 But by 2006, John Bellinger, the Department of State's Legal
Adviser, explained that "our traditional criminal justice system is simply not
well-suited to respond to the scale and magnitude of the threat posed by al
Qaida."267 Unfortunately, although the current Administration had originally
decided to terminate the usage of the term "enemy combatant," it has kept in
place a similar regime of indeterminate detentions for public enemies-a
regime that would obviously not be available under domestic criminal law.
2. Challenging the Existence of an Emergency
Humanist Decisionism prioritizes the question that logically precedes
emergency-powers debates: "Is this really an emergency?" On this issue,
Humanist Decisionism sides with Legalist approaches that have underscored
the importance of a contextual case-by-case factual questioning of the
existence of an emergency.268 While many participants in the legal system
can and should debate the existence of emergencies, courts in particular
should actively engage the issue and should not defer to the political
branches. In many current and past national security emergencies, courts
have either actively agreed with the political branches that an emergency
265 Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1823, 1867 (2009)
(quoting EMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATUONs, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATuRE 321 (G. G. & J. Robinson 1797)).
266 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 10 1 Am. J. INT'L L. 185, 198 (2007).
268 See, e.g., Dyzenhaus, supra note 7.
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situation in fact exists,269 or simply left the political declaration of an
emergency unchallenged. 270
This idea that the Judiciary should question the political branches with
regard to the existence of an emergency is not new. Two key historical
examples of similar judicial insights are Holmes's opinion in Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair (1924)271 and the dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts in
Korematsu (1 944).272 In Chastleton, Congress extended the Rent Act of
1919, for seven months and then for two more years, stating that an
emergency still existed. The Court stated that the emergency that justified
interference with the ordinarily existing private rights in 1919 had come to an
end in 1922 and no longer could be applied consistently with the Fifth
Amendment. Holmes wrote:
We repeat ... the respect due to a declaration [of an emergency] [b]y the
Legislature so far as it relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court
is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of
the law depends upon the truth of what is declared.... And still more
obviously so far as this declaration looks to the fu~ture it can be no more
than prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. A law depending
upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold
it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even
though valid when passed.2 73
When a court encounters a legislative declaration of an emergency, it must
evaluate it, and cannot simply shut its eyes when it concludes it to be
mistaken.
Interestingly, Holmes's skepticism about emergencies was relied on in
269 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952)
("There can be no doubt that the emergency which caused the President to seize these
steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country."); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 219 (1944) ("The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the same
reason a military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion was in the nature
of group punishment based on antagonism to those of Japanese origin.").
270 See, e.g., Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
559 F.3d 595, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Having declared a national emergency to deal with
the threat of Iraq in 1990, President George H.W. Bush imposed economic sanctions
prohibiting unauthorized travel to Iraq and authorized the Treasury Department's Office
of Foreign Assets Control ('OFAC') to promulgate regulations in accordance with those
executive orders."); United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990, President George H.W. Bush
issued four emergency Executive Orders declaring a national emergency.
271 264 U.S. 543, 546 (1924).
272 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
273 Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 547-48 (citations omitted).
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Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Korematsu. Roberts noted that the
majority understood the Civilian Exclusion Order that directed that all
persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded from a certain area to be "a
temporary expedient made necessary by a sudden emergency."274 Roberts
relied on Chastleton, writing:
My agreement would depend on the definition and application of the terms
"temporary" and "emergency." No pronouncement of the commanding
officer can, in my view, preclude judicial inquiry and determination
whether an emergency ever existed and whether, if so, it remained, at the
date of the restraint out of which the litigation arose.275
A more recent example of such judicial engagement with the question of
the existence of an emergency is the Belmarsh (2004) decision, also known
as "Britain's Guantanamo Bay."276 Belmarsh involved a post-9/l 1 "Anti-
Terrorism Act" enacted by the British Parliament in 2001 that granted the
government the power to indefinitely detain non-nationals who had been
determined to be a security risk, but for various reasons could not be
deported.277 The detainees held in indefinite detention in Belmarsh prison
challenged the statutory provision that authorized their detention, claiming
that there was no public emergency threatening the "life of the nation." The
House of Lords held by a majority that, while the detention was legal under
the Anti-Terrorism Act, this Act was incompatible with the articles of the
European Convention on Human Rights because it discriminated between
nationals and non-nationals. 278
Lord Hoffmnan offered a much more critical view of the Anti-Terrorism
Act. He found the whole Act incompatible with the United Kingdom's
constitution and its commitment to human rights. His view was that the
ultimate test-that there is a "threat to the life of the nation"--was not met.
He wrote, "the question is whether such a [terrorist threat posed by
fundamentalist Islamic terror groups] is a threat to the life of the nation,'2 79
and concluded that "they do not threaten the life of the nation,"280 and that
"[w]hether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no doubt
274 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 23 1.
25I.at 23 1 n. 8.
276 See Denise Winterman, Belmarsh - Britain's Guantanamo Bay? BBC NEWS
(Oct. 6, 2004, 10:01 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk news/magazine/37 14864.stm.
277 A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] IJKHL 71, [2005] 2 A.C. 68
(appeal taken from Eng.).
278 Id. at 127.
279 Id. at 13 1.
280 Id. at 132.
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that we shall survive Al-Qaeda."281 This judicial posture reflects the
humanist concern with the proper use of the term "emergency."
A similar challenge to the existence of an emergency appears in the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Natural Resources v. Winter.282 I Winter,
environmental groups sued the Navy on the grounds that the Navy's training
exercises violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
and other federal laws. The suit was based on the Navy's failure to submit an
environmental impact statement as required by NEPA. 2 83 Plaintiffs argued
that the Navy's use of active sonar while training in the waters of southern
California would harm many species of marine mammals, including
dolphins, whales, and sea lions.284 The Navy argued in turn that "emergency
circumstances" prevented its normal compliance with NEPA. 2 85 The Ninth
Circuit held that there was a serious question regarding whether the Council
on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) interpretation of the "emergency
circumstances" regulation was lawful.2 86 The court questioned whether there
was a true "emergency" here, given that the Navy had been on notice of its
obligation to comply with NEPA.2 87
However, the Supreme Court reversed.28 8 The decision, written by Chief
Justice Roberts, reasserted the political assumptions of necessity and
catastrophe. The decision begins with the observation that "[tlo be prepared
for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." 289 Roberts
based the reversal on the Decisionist premise that courts should give
"deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning
the relative importance of a particular military interest."1290
Humanist Decisionism supports a rigorous, Humanist judicial scrutiny of
all legislative and executive declarations of emergencies. This scrutiny is
critical with regard to prevalent articulations of politics as a realm of
necessity, catastrophe, and enmity. The humanist judge soberly examines
281 Id.
2 82 Natujral Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd,
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
283 Id. at 660-61.
284 Id at 665--66.
285 Id. at 68 1.
286 Id. at 686.
287 Id at 683.
288 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 365 (2008).
29I.at 370 (quoting George Washington First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1
A COMPILATION OF TH-E MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 65
(James D. Richardson ed., 1896)).
20I.at 367 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
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every situation with a genuine openness to the possibility and desirability of
an alternative set of political attitudes.
3. Balancing Hostility with Hospitality
At the national level, acts of friendship and hospitality can balance acts
of hostility. Here I will briefly discuss two contemporary situations in which
such balancing is appealing; the first deals with policy, the second with legal
and political rhetoric. First, the government can implement policies of
generosity specifically targeting groups or communities inadvertently
affected by acts of hostility. Second, political and legal actors can effectively
interrupt hostile public perceptions of "the enemy" by actively choosing
rhetoric of friendship and hospitality over rhetoric of rights.
First, even if the safety of the public at times necessitates security
measures, I argue that these measures should be-and to some extent already
are-balanced with policies of friendship and hospitality. This balance is
desirable because (1) more friendliness may decrease the overall level of
violence (a utilitarian justification); and (2) cultivating social and
governmental attitudes that are less driven by fear and self-preservation and
more driven by responsibility and social obligation may generate more
meaningful concepts of citizenship and community (an ethical justification).
An example of such balancing involves the treatment of civilian refugees
displaced as a consequence of the U.S. struggles against terrorism. Financial
aid to refugees and to countries who host them is one example of a desirable
friendly policy.29' Indeed, the current Administration has recently announced
a financial grant of one million dollars to Pakistan as a host of a large number
of Afghani refugees. 292 More robust acts of friendship and hospitality might
include welcoming of such refugees into the United States by granting
asylum or special immigration visas.293
291 In 2009 alone, about 26,800 Afghans requested refuge. See UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES 2009 (Mar. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4ba734 I a9.html.
292 US. Pledges Additional Funding for Displaced Afghans in Pakistan, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.america.govfst/texttransenglish/2010/October/20 1010151 23627su0.528576 1.
html ("[T]he U.S. Pledges Additional $1 Million to Help Displaced Afghans in Pakistan
and Their Host Communities ... The announcement of the U.S. contribution is in
addition to the $75 million in other 2010 assistance this year to Afghan refugees-both
those remaining in Pakistan and Iran and those returning to Afghanistan. It reflects U.S.
support for policies of tolerance by the government of Pakistan toward Afghan refugees,
and for cooperation between the Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and the
Pakistani communities that neighbor them.").
293 For a narrowly tailored example of such a special immigration visa, see The
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. I110- 18 1, § 1244, 122 Stat.
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Second, a persistent social anmesia regarding the identity and nature of
the enemy in the current "war on terror" has resulted in a need for occasional
announcements to remind the American public that "[a]s Americans we are
not-and will never be-at war with Islam."1294 Most recently, this
forgetfulness generated uproar around a plan to build a Muslim community
center in lower Manhattan.295 The dilemma here is how best to articulate the
distinction between a small group of criminals and a respectable religious
faith shared by millions. Is there something in current rhetoric about Islam
that incites this forgetfulness?
The primary justification for the claim that we are not "at war with
Islam" is religious freedom. For example, Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of
New York City, has defended the plan to build the Mosque in downtown
Manhattan on these grounds: "[W]e are Americans, each with an equal right
to worship and pray where we choose . .. . By affirming that basic idea, we
will honor America's values."296 Likewise, President Obama said: "This
country stands for the proposition that all men and women are created equal,
that they have certain inalienable rights . .. [a]nd what that means is that if
you could build a church on a site, you could build a synagogue on a site, if
you could build a Hindu temple on a site, then you should be able to build a
mosque on the site."129 7
The rights-based argument is correct. Muslims enjoy the constitutional
right under the First Amendment to freely practice their faith just as
Christians, Hindus, and Jews do. But there is another-much more
powerful-form. of rhetoric in the President's recent addresses to Islam that
may have more purchase: direct declarations of hospitality and friendship.
"We've got millions of Muslim Americans, our fellow citizens, in this
country," President Obama said in response to the mosque in lower
3 (2008) ("Special Immigrant Status for Certain Iraqis": authorizing 5,000 special
immigrant visas annually for fiscal years 2008-2012, and creating a new category of
special immigrant visa for Iraqi nationals who have provided faithful and valuable service
to the U.S. Government, while employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq,
at least one year after March 20, 2003, and who have experienced or are experiencing an
ongoing serious threat as a consequence of that employment).
294 Anne Barnard & Manny Fernandez, On Anniversary of Sept. I], Rifts Amid
Mourning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at AlI (quoting President Obama).
295 Laurie Goodstein, Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at Al ("While a high-profile battle rages over a mosque near
ground zero in Manhattan, heated confrontations have also broken out in communities
across the country where mosques are proposed for far less hallowed locations.").
296 Michael Bloomberg, A National Conversation: NYC's Religious Promise, N.Y.
POST, Aug. 24, 2010, at 23.
297 Helene Cooper, Obama Tries to Calm Religious Tensions in Call for Religious
Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2010, at Al.
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Manhattan.298 "They're going to school with our kids. They're our
neighbors. They're our friends. They're our co-workers. And when we start
acting as if their religion is somehow offensive, what are we saying to
them?" 299
"I am grateful for your hospitality and the hospitality of the people of
Egypt"--thus begins President Obama's address to the Muslim world in
Cairo in June of 2009.300 Throughout this speech the President reaches out to
Islam with rhetoric of gratitude, hospitality, and peace. He urges Muslims
and non-Muslims to "have the courage to make a new beginning, keeping in
mind what has been written."30' And what has been written? Obama then
quotes the Talmud-"- The whole of the Torah is for the purpose of promoting
peace"--3 2 and the New Testament-" Blessed are the peacemakers, for they
shall be called sons of God."130 3 Interestingly, though, he first quotes a
passage from the Koran that, by contrast, does not mention peace: "0
mankind! We have created you male and female and we have made you into
nations and tribes so that you may know one another."304 Here, mankind has
been divided into nations not for war or peace or prosperity or progress, but
for one purpose: "so that you may know one another." Knowledge of the
other person and nation is the sole purpose of the separation of mankind into
nations-says the Koran text that closes Obama's speech. This was our
definition of hospitality: conscious listening to the other, welcoming the face
of the other, and occupying a relation of deference to the other. Perhaps
Obama's concluding words may help us understand what deference to the
other might mean in this context-"It's a faith in other people, and it's what
brought me here today." 305 This rhetoric of friendship, hospitality, and
responsibility towards Islam is different from the strictly legalistic rhetoric of
religious liberty pursued elsewhere by the President and by others. Such
rhetoric is important, especially in times of hostilities, because it dares to
imagine a political and legal alternative to fear, vulnerability, and enmity.
298 Id,
2 99 Id (emphasis added).
3 00 Barack Obama 's Cairo Speech, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/Jun/04/barack-obama-keynote-speech-egypt.
301 Id
302 Id (quoting Gittin 59b).
303 Id (quoting Matthew 5:9).
304 I.(emphasis added).
305 Id.
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V1I. CONCLUSION
Vice President Dick Cheney declared shortly after September 11, 2001,
that we should consider the current period not an emergency at all, but "the
new normalcy." 306 Necessity, enmity, and catastrophe have indeed become
the normal politics shared by many Legalists and Decisionists in emergency-
powers debates. Legalist and Decisionist disagreements often turn on the
balance of powers and the proper role of law in the "war on terror." Should
the primary tools for fighting terror be norms or decisions? Legalists have
argued for the former and Decisionists for the latter. Legalists have argued
that the rule of law must survive at all times. Decisionists have insisted that
the key to the nation's survival is a strong, decisive executive branch that is
sometimes unbound by legal norms. But despite these disagreements, many
versions of Decisionism, and Legalism have conceded that the state of
emergency has indeed become "the new normalcy." This Article argues that
we should develop an alternative vision of the human and the state as they
exist in times of crisis.
306 Lynn Ludlow, Paper Tigers: Normalcy? No, Nay, Never, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4,
2001, at C2; see also Bob Woodward, CIA Told To Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin
Laden, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 200 1, at Al.
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